This article explores an episode of post-colonial state violence in the newly independent Zimbabwe, namely state-sanctioned atrocities by the army unit known as Fifth Brigade, perpetrated against the Ndebele of Matabeleland and Midlands region. This episode of political and ethnic violence that occurred between 1983-87 is referred to as both the Matabeleland Massacres and Gukurahundi. Members of the British government in Zimbabwe, which included a British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) on the ground, were intimately aware of the violence that resulted in the death of between ten and twenty thousand people. This article analyses official British and US government communications between the British High Commission, Harare, and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Cabinet Office, the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Defence, London, as well as between the US Department of State and the US Embassy in Harare. Analysis of the documents dated between January and March 1983 sheds a critical new lens on Gukurahundi, establishing what knowledge was available to the British and US governments about the persistent and relentless atrocities taking place; the diplomatic approaches pursued by both governments in response; and their rationale for same. The hitherto unavailable material presented here was obtained by Freedom of Information requests to various British Government offices and to the US Department of State. Analysis establishes that the British High Commission, Harare, had detailed knowledge of events unfolding in Matabeleland from an early stage of Gukurahundi, yet senior members of BMATT and the British diplomatic team in Harare, in contrast to their US counterparts, were consistent in their efforts to minimise the magnitude of Fifth Brigade atrocities. That the British government chose to adopt a policy of wilful blindness towards the atrocities undoubtedly constituted naked realpolitik.

Directive 1999/31 on the Landfill of Waste has finally been adopted and entered into force on 16 July 1999. This paper will analyse in detail the provisions of the Directive, including their legislative development, with particular attention to the prospects for UK implementation. It will be concluded that while the Directive is clearly a step in the right direction, close attention must be paid to the context in which it is implemented in order that these benefits are not negated by lack of coordination and underdevelopment of alternative waste management options.

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This article explores the French government's political and military relationship with Rwanda since 1975, with a particular focus on the period from 1990 and throughout the genocide of 1994. An argument is made that the French state, through its behaviour in Rwanda before and during the genocide of 1994 is complicit under international criminal law. As a concept, complicity provides a lens for understanding the scope of liability of states as responsible actors within the international system. The article argues that that the knowing participatory role played by the French throughout the period of the Rwandan genocide, can be construed as complicity in genocide. This is a criminal breach of international law. "The more one looks, the more one finds examples in the recent history of genocide of minority groups whose fate hinges on their historic connection with Western, usually former imperial powers" 1 Four years after the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the French Assembly issued a report on its investigations into the killings. In doing so, the main Rapporteur of the report confidently asserted that, in relation to genocide, 'France is neither responsible nor guilty' 2. This statement contradicted the actual evidence presented to the panel, but which was ignored. As the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) caustically noted, '[t]he [French Assembly] report's evidence and the report's findings seemed unrelated' 3. In addition to such contradictions with the basic facts about the genocide, significant aspects of French involvement in Rwanda were omitted from the inquiry from the start. Foremost of these was an indicative picture of French military assistance to Rwanda throughout the 1990s until the end of the genocide of the Tutsi in 1994. Such a portrayal would have provided a contextualisation of France's