The global population at risk from mosquito-borne diseases—including dengue, yellow fever, chikungunya and Zika—is expanding in concert with changes in the distribution of two key vectors: Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus . The distribution of these species is largely driven by both human movement and the presence of suitable climate. Using statistical mapping techniques, we show that human movement patterns explain the spread of both species in Europe and the United States following their introduction. We find that the spread of Ae. aegypti is characterized by long distance importations, while Ae. albopictus has expanded more along the fringes of its distribution. We describe these processes and predict the future distributions of both species in response to accelerating urbanization, connectivity and climate change. Global surveillance and control efforts that aim to mitigate the spread of chikungunya, dengue, yellow fever and Zika viruses must consider the so far unabated spread of these mosquitos. Our maps and predictions offer an opportunity to strategically target surveillance and control programmes and thereby augment efforts to reduce arbovirus burden in human populations globally.

SummaryBackgroundSince late 2015, an epidemic of yellow fever has caused more than 7334 suspected cases in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including 393 deaths. We sought to understand the spatial spread of this outbreak to optimise the use of the limited available vaccine stock.MethodsWe jointly analysed datasets describing the epidemic of yellow fever, vector suitability, human demography, and mobility in central Africa to understand and predict the spread of yellow fever virus. We used a standard logistic model to infer the district-specific yellow fever virus infection risk during the course of the epidemic in the region.FindingsThe early spread of yellow fever virus was characterised by fast exponential growth (doubling time of 5–7 days) and fast spatial expansion (49 districts reported cases after only 3 months) from Luanda, the capital of Angola. Early invasion was positively correlated with high population density (Pearson's r 0·52, 95% CI 0·34–0·66). The further away locations were from Luanda, the later the date of invasion (Pearson's r 0·60, 95% CI 0·52–0·66). In a Cox model, we noted that districts with higher population densities also had higher risks of sustained transmission (the hazard ratio for cases ceasing was 0·74, 95% CI 0·13–0·92 per log-unit increase in the population size of a district). A model that captured human mobility and vector suitability successfully discriminated districts with high risk of invasion from others with a lower risk (area under the curve 0·94, 95% CI 0·92–0·97). If at the start of the epidemic, sufficient vaccines had been available to target 50 out of 313 districts in the area, our model would have correctly identified 27 (84%) of the 32 districts that were eventually affected.InterpretationOur findings show the contributions of ecological and demographic factors to the ongoing spread of the yellow fever outbreak and provide estimates of the areas that could be prioritised for vaccination, although other constraints such as vaccine supply and delivery need to be accounted for before such insights can be translated into policy.FundingWellcome Trust.

Economic games such as the public goods game are increasingly being used to measure social behaviours in humans and non-human primates. The results of such games have been used to argue that people are pro-social, and that humans are uniquely altruistic, willingly sacrificing their own welfare in order to benefit others. However, an alternative explanation for the empirical observations is that individuals are mistaken, but learn, during the game, how to improve their personal payoff. We test between these competing hypotheses, by comparing the explanatory power of different behavioural rules, in public goods games, where individuals are given different amounts of information. We find: (i) that individual behaviour is best explained by a learning rule that is trying to maximize personal income; (ii) that conditional cooperation disappears when the consequences of cooperation are made clearer; and (iii) that social preferences, if they exist, are more anti-social than pro-social.

'Noise' in this study, in the sense of evolutionary game theory, refers to deviations from prevailing behav-ioral rules. Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination in networks, we tested 'what kind of noise' is supported by behavioral evidence. This empirical analysis complements a growing theoretical literature on 'how noise matters' for equilibrium selection. We find that the vast majority of decisions (96%) constitute myopic best responses, but deviations continue to occur with probabilities that are sensitive to their costs, that is, less frequent when implying larger payoff losses relative to the myopic best response. In addition, deviation rates vary with patterns of realized payoffs that are related to trial-and-error behavior. While there is little evidence that deviations are clustered in time or space, there is evidence of individual heterogeneity.

We study evolutionary dynamics in assignment games where many agents interact anonymously at virtually no cost. The process is decentralized, very little information is available and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a completely uncoupled learning process that selects a subset of the core of the game with a natural equity interpretation. This happens even though agents have no knowledge of other agents' strategies, payoffs, or the structure of the game, and there is no central authority with such knowledge either. In our model, agents randomly encounter other agents, make bids and offers for potential partnerships and match if the partnerships are profitable. Equity is favored by our dynamics because it is more stable, not because of any ex ante fairness criterion.JEL classifications: C71, C73, C78, D83