We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty.In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept.We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TUgames are convex. AbstractWe introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions.One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak SequentialCore as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TU-games are convex.

We study bankruptcy games where the estate and the claims have stochastic values. We use the Weak Sequential Core as the solution concept for such games. We test the stability of a number of well known division rules in this stochastic setting and find that most of them are unstable, except for the Constrained Equal Awards rule, which is the only one belonging to the Weak Sequential Core.Keywords: transferable utility games, uncertainty, weak sequential core, bankruptcy games JEL classification: C71, C73 Sztochasztikus csődjátékokHabis Helga -P. Jean-Jacques Herings Összefoglaló Olyan csődjátékokat vizsgálunk, amelyekben a felosztandó vagyon és a követelések értéke is sztochasztikus változó. A játék megoldására a gyenge szekvenciális magot alkalmazzuk. Számos jól ismert felosztási szabály stabilitását megvizsgáljuk ebben a sztochasztikus környezetben, és azt találjuk, hogy legtöbbjük nem stabil. Az egyetlen kivétel a korlátos egyenlő díjazás szabálya.Ez az egyetlen olyan szabály, amely eleme a gyenge szekvenciális magnak. We test the stability of a number of well known division rules in this stochastic setting and find that most of them are unstable, except for the Constrained Equal Awards rule, which is the only one belonging to the Weak Sequential Core.