_id=3197329 [http://perma.cc/UF5A-67Y8]. 10. See infra text accompanying notes 104-42. 2019] ANTI COMP ETI TIV E ME RGERS 1033 economic doctrine and traditional antitrust rules concerning competitive harm. We comprehensively apply these well-established principles to purchasing rather than selling, and to labor rather than products. I. SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND LABOR MARKET COMPETITION The goal of antitrust policy toward mergers is to protect consumers from noncompetitive price increases or reductions in output, which can be measured by quantity, but also by reductions in quality or innovation. 11 Under antitrust's merger provision, section 7 of the Clayton Act, the court must identify some "line of commerce" and "section of the country" 12 in which a contemplated merger threatens lower output and higher prices. This approach is reflected in the enforcement Agencies' Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 13 The most commonly recognized competitive harm from mergers is higher prices charged by sellers. This does not tell the entire story, however. Mergers can also lead to anticompetitive output reductions resulting from diminished competition on the buying side of the market. 14 The antitrust laws pertaining to mergers do not distinguish between seller side and buyer side competitive harm. Section 7 of the Clayton Act simply requires that the merger involve an "activity affecting commerce" that may "substantially. .. lessen competition" or tend to "create a monopoly." 15 Coverage that includes both sellers and buyers is not universal in the Clayton Act. For example, section 3 of the Act, which reaches anticompetitive tying and exclusive dealing, applies only to sales, not to purchases. 16 This is also true of most of the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act, which outlaws certain discriminations in price between "different purchasers," thus indicating that this provision applies only to sellers. 17 By contrast, the Clayton Act merger law was drafted so as to apply to anticompetitive mergers by both sellers and buyers.

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A wide variety of scholarship has addressed the law of race relations during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Much of that scholarship has presented the judicial record in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era cases as reactionary and somehow in violation of the basic principles of equality implicit in the American Constitution, particularly in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments. Professor Hovenkamp calls this view into question by examining the science and social science of that period and the use of scientific information in race relations cases. He concludes that late nineteenth and early twentieth century courts used prevailing scientific theories in much the same way that the Supreme Court used such theories in Brown v. Board of Education-thatjudicial decisions of the time were very much a product of the prevailing scientific views concerning the wisdom of separation of the races. Thus, the significant difference between the, Progressive Era and the Warren Court lay not in the use of social science, but rather in the content of the science itself The courts must bear a heavy share of the burden of American racism. An outpouring of recent historical scholarship on racism and the American law reveals the outrageous and humiliating extent to which American lawyers, judges, and legislators created, perpetuated, and defended racist American institutions.' Legal rules recognized and justified

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