After two decades of focusing on deficit reduction and restructuring of operations, governments in many areas of the world are once again contemplating new policies and expenditures. In Canada, where budgetary surpluses have recently replaced deficits, the federal government has been asking whether it still has the capacity to make informed choices about new programs. This article examines Canada’s recent efforts in rebuilding its policy capacity. It asks, first, to what extent and in what way was policy capacity originally lost. Second, it appraises the adequacy of new policy “networks,” consisting of think tanks, consultants and government officials, as “virtual replacements” for former government‐controlled advisory bodies, royal commissions, and in‐house policy units. Finally, it notes the relative absence of parliamentarians, and even the political executive, from capacity‐rebuilding activities, a deficiency that in the long run may undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of such efforts.

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It has been suggested that the Canadian prime minister tends to enjoy powers to a degree that is unhealthy in a democratic society. This article evaluates the "prime minister as autocrat" argument that has gained currency, if not in the academic literature, certainly in the popular media. It is suggested that while there has been a relative increase in the concentration of power in the centre — the centre defined as the prime minister, his entourage and key central agencies — the portrait of prime ministerial autocracy has been overdrawn. None the less, reforms are desirable. Particularly ones that create or enhance counterweights to prime ministerial power will likely improve Canadian democracy. These reforms should focus not so much on strengthening the role of individual MPs but on reinforcing the position of cabinet, the parliamentary caucus and senate vis-à-vis the prime minister. In this respect, five possible reforms are discussed, and their prospects of being adopted assessed: proportional representation for the House of Commons, an elected senate, strengthened parliamentary caucuses, a fixed time-table for elections and the New Zealand approach to the appointment of senior officials.

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