We argue that US welfare would rise if unemployment insurance were increased for younger and decreased for older workers. This is because the young tend to lack the means to smooth consumption during unemployment and want jobs to accumulate high-return human capital. So unemployment insurance is most valuable to them, while moral hazard is mild. By calibrating a life cycle model with unemployment risk and endogenous search effort, we find that allowing unemployment replacement rates to decline with age yields sizeable welfare gains to US workers. (JEL D91, E24, J13, J64, J65)

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In 1994, Argentina introduced Pension Reform and Unemployment Benefits as a major reform component to its social security system. This papers analyzes the effects of introducing new individual accounts in the pension system -which was under effect between 1994 and 2008-over wages, employment and poverty.While the macroeconomic effects of a change in the pension system is an issue that is relatively well addressed by the literature, its microeconomic effects are often neglected in the analysis.We use a CGE model to evaluate the effects of the reform on labor market and poverty. Our results indicate that if private pension funds are allocated to physical investment, labor demand and wages increase and poverty goes down.However, these effects fade out if funds of private accounts are used to buy government debt.

We assess optimal unemployment benefit level and duration in a labor market with many informal jobs. Using administrative data from Argentina, a country with high informality, we exploit discontinuities in duration, and a reform that increases benefits. We find that increasing benefits hardly extends unemployment spells but raises re-employment wages. In contrast, extending unemployment benefits prolongs unemployment spells with no effect on re-employment wages. In a search model, we derive sufficient statistics to analyze the welfare effects of a reform that increases benefits by shortening duration. Calibrating our formula using our empirical results, we find that welfare would increase with higher benefits and shorter duration.