One of the challenges associated with emerging forms of external reporting is finding efficient and effective means to enhance the credibility of these reports (IAASB 2016). This study examines a novel credibility-enhancing mechanism, combined assurance (CA), where the credibility-enhancing processes of the internal auditor, the external auditor, and the effectiveness of risk management and internal controls and processes are publicly reported by the company (audit committee). We identify the most appropriate setting currently available (Integrated Reporting in South Africa) to examine whether there are benefits associated with communicating the details of CA within companies' integrated reports. We find that communicating the details of CA is beneficial in reducing both analysts' forecast errors and dispersion, and also in reducing the bid-ask spread for companies where the information environment is weaker. The implications of these findings for regulators, standard-setters, assurance providers and users of extended external reports are discussed. 3 The King IV Report (IODSA 2016) continues to develop the concept of combined assurance and recognizes the following assurance providers: line functions that own and manage risk and opportunity; specialist functions that facilitate and oversee risk and opportunity; internal assurance providers; external assurance providers; and the governing body, audit, and regulatory inspectors. 4 Refer to Appendix 1 for an example of a combined assurance report. sectional variations in the implementation and communication quality of this voluntary novel cost-efficient credibility-enhancing mechanism. 6 Using the top 100 companies 7 by market capitalization listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) between 2009 and 2015, we identify an increasing adoption of CA during our sample period. Our analyses show that both the implementation and the communication quality of CA significantly reduce analysts' forecast errors and dispersion, suggesting that this new cost-efficient credibility-enhancing mechanism is useful to analysts in their earnings forecasting tasks in that they make more accurate forecasts as well as having fewer disagreements. 8 Further, we observe that the communication of CA reduces the bid-ask spread for companies for which the information environment is weaker, proxied by the number of analysts' following. Our results are obtained after controlling for the disclosure quality of the integrated report, and the issuance of CSR reports. This provides evidence that CA adds additional value to the disclosures for capital market participants and helps to further reduce information asymmetry for reporting companies. The study directly responds to current calls for more research on credibility enhancement techniques for emerging forms of external reporting (Cohen and Simnett 2015; IAASB 2016).The results are of interest to various parties, including companies seeking to implement ways to enhance the credibility of their integrated reports, assurance practitioners

We examine whether independent assurance of CSR information increases investors' fundamental value estimates, whether this effect depends on the type of assurance (reasonable versus limited) and whether investors are prompted to explicitly assess the company's performance. We conduct a 3x2 between-subjects experiment, with CSR assurance being manipulated at three levels (no assurance, limited assurance and reasonable assurance) and explicit assessment at two levels (no explicit assessment and explicit assessment). We find that when there is no prompt to explicitly assess performance, the investors who receive an assurance report at a reasonable level derive higher fundamental value estimates than the investors who receive CSR information which is not assured or assured at a limited level. Investors who receive either a reasonable or limited assurance level report perceive the information to be more reliable than the investors who receive CSR information which is not assured, regardless of the prompt for explicit assessment.

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