This Viewpoint calls attention to the pervasive wrongs related to knowledge production, use, and circulation in global health, many of which are taken for granted. We argue that common practices in academic global health (eg, authorship practices, research partnerships, academic writing, editorial practices, sensemaking practices, and the choice of audience or research framing, questions, and methods) are peppered with epistemic wrongs that lead to or exacerbate epistemic injustice. We describe two forms of epistemic wrongs, credibility deficit and interpretive marginalisation, which stem from structural exclusion of marginalised producers and recipients of knowledge. We then illustrate these forms of epistemic wrongs using examples of common practices in academic global health, and show how these wrongs are linked to the pose (or positionality) and the gaze (or audience) of producers of knowledge. The epistemic injustice framework shown in this Viewpoint can help to surface, detect, communicate, make sense of, avoid, and potentially undo unfair knowledge practices in global health that are inflicted upon people in their capacity as knowers, and as producers and recipients of knowledge, owing to structural prejudices in the processes involved in knowledge production, use, and circulation in global health.

Spurred by the Cairo Conference in 1994 that espoused the cause for reproductive rights, an activist group of twelve American women of colour first introduced the concept of 'reproductive justice'. 1 Loreta Ross, one of the founders of the reproductive justice movement, mentioned that upon attending the conference the group recognised that women's ability to control what happens to their bodies is constantly challenged by poverty, racism, environmental degradation, colonialism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, structural inequalities, and so on. 2 'Reproductive justice' was a term coined by them to introduce a broader approach that moved away from the restrictive notion of choice and addressed the aspects of women's social status and intersectional forms of oppression that threatened Black women's bodily integrity. It soon became a larger movement towards reproductive dignity by incorporating women of colour from across the world.While the intersectional aspect of reproductive justice has garnered a good amount of scholarly attention, the theoretical outlining of justice (that includes intersectionality) has received little to none.In this paper I attempt to clarify the relevant kind of freedom an adequate theory of reproductive justice would postulate. To do so, I first elucidate the features of reproductive justice as understood by the founders of the reproductive justice movement (Section 2). I then compare two approaches to reproductive freedom: an approach that takes freedom as non-interference as integral to reproductive justice (Section 3) and an approach that sees freedom as non-domination 1

There is a well-established common law doctrine for ascertaining information disclosure in informed consent claims within the treatment context that governs the doctor–patient relationship. But there is no such doctrine in clinical research governing the researcher–participant relationship in India. India, however, is not exceptional in this regard. Common law countries like the United States and Canada at most have sparse, non-systematised, criteria for such cases; arguably, a doctrine for research is at its nascent stage. But the adequacy of the existing criteria for settling informed consent claims in research has hardly ever been discussed. Furthermore, a specific discussion on the applicability of this ‘nascent doctrine’ to India is non-existent. This article discusses both. The article examines case law from India and other common law jurisdictions that hint at developments in this area. It suggests that Indian courts need to move abreast with other jurisdictions to better protect India’s patients and research participants.