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We investigate the influence of the dual board structure on the financial performance of Islamic banks. The paper also investigates the unique agency relationships using a sample of 90 Islamic banks across 13 countries over the period [2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012][2013][2014]. We find that the larger the Shari'ah Supervisory Board (SSB) the better the financial performance and this result reinforces the fundamental role of the SSB to certify permissible financial instruments and products. We also find evidence of the scope of operation hypothesis with respect to both the board of directors and the SSB as Islamic banks are characterised by a higher degree of complex operations. Interestingly, we find that a larger SSB size may result in lower agency costs and that the greater the size of the unrestricted contracts, the higher the agency costs. This implies that unrestricted profit-sharing contracts are one of the main sources of the unique agency relationships in Islamic banks. The paper has a number of policy implications for regulators including the design of governance mechanisms in Islamic banks and the dynamics of unrestricted contracts. Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks: New Insights for Dual Board Structure and Agency Relationships AbstractWe investigate the influence of the dual board structure on the financial performance of Islamic banks. The paper also investigates the unique agency relationships using a sample of 90 Islamic banks across 13 countries over the period 2006-2014. We find that the larger the Shari'ah Supervisory Board (SSB) the better the financial performance and this result reinforces the fundamental role of the SSB to certify permissible financial instruments and products. We also find evidence of the scope of operation hypothesis with respect to both the board of directors and the SSB as Islamic banks are characterised by a higher degree of complex operations. Interestingly, we find that a larger SSB size may result in lower agency costs and that the greater the size of the unrestricted contracts, the higher the agency costs. This implies that unrestricted profit-sharing contracts are one of the main sources of the unique agency relationships in Islamic banks. The paper has a number of policy implications for regulators including the design of governance mechanisms in Islamic banks and the dynamics of unrestricted contracts.

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We investigate the influence of CEOs' demographic characteristics (e.g. age, board experience, professional experience, education and gender) on corporate risk-taking for a sample of 892 IPOs floated in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Using fixed effects and system GMM models we find that younger and shorter tenured CEOs and those with postgraduate qualifications are more likely to consider risky decisions. We also find a highly significant and positive relationship between CEO previous board experience and corporate risk-taking. Interestingly and consistent with the recent literature, we find that female CEOs are not risk averse compared with their male counterparts. Moreover, we find that corporate risk-taking is higher the greater the proportion of state-ownership. Finally, our study may provide useful insights to shareholders as they generally seek to hire the most talented CEOs with the relevant set of skills to achieve shareholders' objectives and improve the Chinese competitiveness in the global market.

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