In the aftermath of World War I, liberal internationalist politicians and intellectuals attempted to lay the ground for a new world order, based on trade and law. Their ambitious project entailed the building of international institutions, as well as the formal outlawing of war with the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928. Among the fiercest critics of the liberal internationalist project of the interwar years was the near-infamous German jurist Carl Schmitt. Today, Schmitt's thought is regularly referenced as an inspiration behind twenty-first century anti-globalism and its attempts at reinforcing national sovereignty and 'take back control' from international institutions. However, Schmitt did not believe that a return to the principles of statehood from before World War I was possible. Rather than an order based on nineteenth century principles regarding the nation state, he advocated the formation of a new political world order that would be able to face the forces of modernity and internationalism. In this article, I chart the challenges of interwar internationalism as Schmitt saw them, together with his alternative solution. Schmitt's alternative entails a recognition of how international and national order has become entangled in a complex way, forcing the rethinking of traditional conceptions of statehood.

JJie vorliegende arbeit beabsichtigt die geschichte einer wichtigen begriffskategorie innerhalb eines beschränkten gebietes und Zeitraums zu geben. Eine ausführliche gesainmtdarstellung der nomina agentis im germanischen war bis vor kurzem noch nicht erschienen. Auch gehört die reichste entwickelung derselben nicht der gemeingermanischen periode, sondern dem einzelleben der dialekte an. Die unvergleichbar höchste blute hat diese kategorie im altnordischen, besonders in der altnordischen poesie, erreicht; altvererbtes und neugeschaffenes tritt uns hier in üppigster fülle entgegen. Bei solchem sachverhalt schien es mir keine allzu willkürliche beschränkung der aufgäbe, sondern vielmehr mit den principien der historisch-genetischen grammatik im vollsten einklang zu sein, wenn ich das absterben und aufleben der einzelnen formalgruppen auf einem einheitlichen Sprachgebiete, und nicht gleichzeitig auf mehreren getrennten, in ihrer continuität und Wechselbeziehung darzulegen suchte; und am reichsten musste widerum die ernte ausfallen, wo die altnordische spräche, vom beginn ihrer sonderentwickelung gerechnet, das feld des erforschens bildete. Bei einer anläge der arbeit wie der eben angedeuteten ist es klar, dass in meiner darstellung solche suffixe keinen platz finden werden, welche schon urgermanisch als tot zu bezeichnen sind. Dies gilt für suffixe wie (/>w/r, vagr, reykr\ u oder vo (Ä/o/>r, drottr, adj. orr), dem primären tu (smif>r, vattr, vor]>r\ den adjectivsuffixen sko und sqo (beiskr, breyskr, loskr, roskr), u. a. Ehe ich diese bemerkungen abschliesse, wird es angemessen sein, Über das Verhältnis meiner arbeit zu einem so• Beitrüge zur geschiente der deutschen eprnche. XIV. \

No abstract

This essay discusses the philosopher Karl Löwith’s critique of the jurist Carl Schmitt and the theologian Friedrich Gogarten. My aim is twofold: first, I want to reconstruct Löwith’s thesis in his 1935 article on Schmitt’s ‘occasional decisionism’ (updated to include a critique of Gogarten in 1960), together with a reading of some central texts by Schmitt and Gogarten; second, I want to raise some critical points regarding Löwith’s claims through these readings. While I agree with Löwith that aspects of Schmitt’s and Gogarten’s thought helped hastening the nihilistic tendencies they themselves claimed to counter, I believe that his diagnosis of their decisionism as nihilism misses important nuances in their work, nuances crucial to the problematization, historicization and philosophical analysis of nihilism. Ultimately, I find that the main point of contestation between Löwith and Schmitt/Gogarten is not whether the latter two affirm modern meaninglessness, but rather whether history can and should be invested with meaning in the first place.

This paper deals with the reactionary form of chronopolitics that characterizes the work of the German jurist, political theorist, and radical conservative intellectual Carl Schmitt (1888–1985). Called both the latest classic of political thought and the Crown Jurist of the Third Reich, Schmitt remains a controversial figure, not least because of his practical support of the Nazi regime and his authoritarianism. Another controversial aspect of Schmitt's work are his unabashed and outspoken references to theology as a resource for legal and political thought. Many commentators regard Schmitt's support for the Nazi regime, his general authoritarianism, and his recourse to theology as expressions of an apocalyptic worldview that is taken to form the basis for his alleged decisionism. This in turn matches an analysis of twentieth-century totalitarianisms as constituting innerworldly forms of radical millenarian faith. However, the structure of Schmitt's politico-theological reason should be understood in a very different way. Rather than affirming the apocalyptic and millenarian energies of totalitarian movements, Schmitt attempted to formulate a theory aimed at containing them and averting their revolutionary fervor in defense of the state. At the heart of this endeavor was the Biblical figure of the katechon, “the restrainer” of the Antichrist and lawlessness as described in the Second Letter to the Thessalonians. Focusing particularly on a short but dense essay published in 1950, the paper lays bare the basis for Schmitt's avertive apocalypticism, or katechontism, which can be regarded as the politico-theological emblem of what Schmitt himself in contrast to decisionism described as concrete order thinking. The form of reactionary chronopolitics Schmitt expresses there is analyzed with the help of theories of modern historical temporality and contextualized through his own references to contemporary conservative thinkers like Hans Freyer, Karl Löwith, and Konrad Weiss.