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Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine how the liability of foreignness (LOF), choice of incorporation and an institutional change independently and jointly affect a reverse merger (RM) firm’s capital-raising performance. Design/methodology/approach The study draws on the data of shell reverse merger transactions in the USA from 2007 to 2016. Findings This paper finds that LOF and the choice of incorporation as a signal have a significant effect on RM firms’ capital-raising performance. In addition, this study finds that the effectiveness of the signaling can be affected by LOF. Finally, this paper finds that an institutional change that lowers the entry barrier to the initial public offering (which is a superior alternate to an RM) affects the impacts of LOF and signaling on RM firms’ capital-raising performance. Originality/value The study contributes to the international business literature by examining the RM (which has been an under-researched topic in the literature) by drawing on the LOF framework. The study finds that LOF and the choice of state for incorporation affect RM firms’ capital-raising performance; moreover, these relationships are affected by an institutional change.

PurposeIn fragile institutional environments, firms often have no choice but bribery as the means to access the services monopolized by the government. Corrupt government officials whose resources are valuable to many different firms can easily find other firms willing to offer bribes. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how this imbalanced interdependence exposes the bribing firm to the hazard of opportunism from the bribed officials.Design/methodology/approachThis study draws on World Business Environment Survey (WBES) data and the instrumental variable (IV) Probit estimator with Heckman correction for the potential selection bias.FindingsThe authors find that the more firms depend on bribery to acquire governmental resources, the severer the level of opportunism they encounter from the government officials. In addition, the authors find that although the presence of a legal alternative to bribery reduces the level of a corrupt government official's opportunism that a bribing firm experiences, the more firms depend on bribery despite the presence of a legal alternative, the higher the level of the corrupt official's opportunism that the firm will experience. Finally, the authors find that establishing a relational contract with government officials reduces the hazard of opportunism.Originality/valueThe study contributes to the resource dependence literature by finding that a greater imbalance in the interdependence between two parties in bribery exposes the more dependent party to a larger hazard of opportunism. The finding that an ineffective alternative to a current resource provider would not strengthen but weaken a resource seeker's bargaining power expands the literature. The authors also contribute to the corruption research by showing the significant strategic, not legal, risk to bribing firms of engaging in bribery, which to date has not been sufficiently discussed.