How many fire companies does New York City need and where should they be located? Given a fire alarm of unknown severity, how many companies should be dispatched to it? These two questions are fundamental issues in the deployment of the City's fire-fighting resources. Since 1968, the New York City Fire Department and The New York City-Rand Institute have carried out a joint project to improve the delivery of Fire Department services in the face of skyrocketing demand. In November 1972, two historical deployment changes were implemented: (a) six of the 375 fire companies in the City were disbanded and seven other companies were permanently relocated; and (b) in high fire incidence areas of the City, an adaptive response policy was implemented. Under adaptive response, fewer companies are initially dispatched to potentially less serious alarms. This is in contrast to the traditional dispatching policy where the same number of companies are dispatched to each alarm. The joint Fire Department-Rand Institute project and the analyses which led to these and other improvements and the wide range of mathematical models used are described. The changes have resulted in savings to the Fire Department of over $5 million per year, a reduction in the workload of fire companies and a more equitable distribution of fire companies throughout the City.

This report describes the effects of 48 hours of sustained operations on the performance of tank crews in communication, driving, surveillance, gunnery, and maintenance tasks. It is a continuation of research to determine the endurance of troops using combat equipment with 48-hour capability. Proficienty tests were constructed for each type of tank-crew activity and made part of a 12-hour field exercise. Two groups of crews were used; one group ne 3tiated a problem course four consecutive times for a total of 48 hours of continuous operation, and a control group followed the-lame procedure but had 24-hour rest periods between each 12 hours r' operation. Only moving sul:veillance and some driving activi"showed significant performance deterioration over a 48-hour I of work without sleep. Major conclusions were: (1) No serious performance decrements result from operating present tank equipment continuously for 48 hours without sleep; (2) Performance at night is not significantly affected by the subject's diurnal rhythm; (3) No major changes in present unit organization and tactical doctrine are necessary to accomplish continuous tank operations for periods up to 48 hours.