Exploring the staggered short sale deregulation on the Chinese stock market as quasi-exogenous shocks, we find that the introduction of short selling is associated with higher deviations of labor investment from the level justified by economic fundamentals, i.e., lower labor investment efficiency. The main effect is more pronounced for firms that are more opaque, younger, and worse governed. Further evidence indicates that short sale deregulation mainly induces firms to overinvest in labor. Our overall findings suggest that faced with downward price pressures, firms may overinvest in labor to convey favorable information to stakeholders, resulting in less efficient labor investments.

This paper investigates and compares the characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board members in Chinese listed firms. The occupational backgrounds of independent directors and supervisory board members in listed firms are very different. Besides, different firms have different preferences in employing independent directors and supervisory board members according to their demands. Moreover, the empirical results show that characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board members have no clear relationship with firm performance. No matter their professional backgrounds or age, the independent directors and supervisory board members do not have the authority to affect the decision making process of management. Thus they cannot really contribute to firm performance.

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