We investigate whether and when firms manage the tone of words in earnings press releases, and how investors react to tone management. We estimate abnormal positive tone, ABTONE, as a measure of tone management from residuals of a tone model that controls for firm quantitative fundamentals such as performance, risk, and complexity. We find that ABTONE predicts negative future earnings and cash flows, is positively associated with upward perception management events, such as, just meeting/beating thresholds, future earnings restatements, SEO, and M&A, and is negatively associated with a downward perception management event, stock option grants. ABTONE has a positive stock return effect at the earnings announcement and a delayed negative reaction in the one and two quarters afterward. Balance sheet constrained firms and older firms are more likely to employ tone management over accruals management. Overall, the evidence is consistent with managers using strategic tone management to mislead investors about firm fundamentals.

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Limited attention theory predicts that higher salience of earnings news implies a stronger immediate market reaction to earnings news and a weaker post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) or reversal (PEAR). Using a new measure, SALIENCE, defined as the number of quantitative items in an earnings press release headline, we find strong evidence consistent with salience effects. Higher SALIENCE is associated with stronger announcement reaction and subsequent PEAR. Managers are more likely to choose higher SALIENCE before selling shares in the post-announcement period and when earnings are high, but less persistent, and to choose lower SALIENCE before stock option grants. The results are robust to using residual salience and an extended set of control variables. The findings are consistent with managers opportunistically headlining positive financial information in the earnings press release to incite over-optimism in investors with limited attention.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate how companies’ reputation affects their selection of auditors. Design/methodology/approach This paper measures company reputation using the reputation scores from Fortune’s “America’s Most Admired Companies” list. Multivariate analysis is performed to examine the impact of company reputation on public companies’ auditor choice. Robustness checks include conducting Heckman procedures and instrumental-variable two-stage least square regressions to control for self-selection bias and using alternative measures to proxy for company reputation and auditor industry expertise. Findings This paper finds that companies with higher reputations are more likely to hire industry-specialist auditors than their counterparts. The results suggest that because of reputation concerns, high-reputation companies have strong incentives to maintain and signal their financial reporting quality, which in turn increase their demand for audit quality. Practical implication This paper suggests that company reputation constitutes an important determinant of auditor selection and, therefore, has both policy and practical implications for the demand of audit services. The paper provides policy-makers and practitioners with insights into critical factors influencing companies’ complex decision process of auditor selection. Originality/value The findings of this paper on the empirical link between company reputation and auditor choice contribute to the auditing literature by enhancing the understanding of the effects of different company-level characteristics in financial reporting and audit planning process. This paper also adds to the growing literature on the influence of company reputation on corporate behavior by documenting the important role that company reputation plays in the managerial decision-making process.

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