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Although regional policy experimentation has become a global trend, the distinct features of experimentalist governance in a given country, such as China, remains to be investigated. This article extends policy process theory by proposing the framework of experimentalist governance with interactive central-local relations or Chinese-style experimentalist governance, which combines three features. First, policy goals and instruments are formed separately and interactively by the central and local governments. Second, the central government is burdened with its own concerns about policy performance for maintaining authority and legitimacy. Third, the evaluation of policy pilots relies primarily on the responses of local governments. We further conceptualize three new patterns of experimentalist governance in China, namely, "comparative trial," "selective recognition," and "adaptive reconciliation," in addition to "hierarchical experimentation." These patterns are illustrated with case studies on four pension policies in China, which are for public sector employees, urban employees, rural residents, and migrant workers.

The existing literature finds that finance has a significant impact on carbon emissions, but there is a lack of theoretical explanation on whether and how digital finance, an important new financial form, affects carbon emissions. This paper uses balanced panel data at the provincial level in China from 2011 to 2018 as a sample to empirically test the relationship between digital finance and carbon emissions and introduces three exogenous events to test the impact of policy shocks. The results show that digital finance has a significant inhibitory effect on carbon emissions; the implementation of the policies of ‘G20 High-Level Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion’, ‘Environmental Protection Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China’, and ‘Interim measures for the management of greenhouse gas voluntary emission reduction’ strengthens the suppression of carbon emissions by digital finance, and the robustness test also supports the protection of digital finance. The research conclusions of this article provide theoretical evidence for understanding the relationship between digital finance and other new financial formats and carbon emissions and provide an empirical basis for policy-makers to promote the development of digital finance to reduce carbon emissions.

This article explores the complicated triangular architecture among innovation diffusion, fiscal recentralization, and authoritarian welfare regimes. We argue that local governments' adoption of innovative welfare policies attracts the attention of central authorities who tend to recognize spontaneous local innovation by releasing central administrative signals. During the era of fiscal recentralization starting from the Chinese Tax‐Sharing System Reform in 1994, cities with higher fiscal dependency are more likely to behave innovatively by adopting a new welfare policy for potential fiscal transfer rewards. The central government's recognition of this innovation stimulates cities' adoption but would reverse the effects of fiscal dependency because of the loss of the “innovativeness” of the adoption and its effectiveness in attracting the attention of superior authorities. We test our theories on the dynamic diffusion with the case of China's Urban Minimum Living Standard Assistance system, an urban poverty‐alleviation policy implemented fully in 1999.