No abstract

No abstract

Fishery observers are prevalent actors in the global effort to reduce discards in fisheries, but there remains considerable uncertainty about how effective they are. We analyzed high-resolution logbook records of individual hauls (n = 127 415) across five-and-a-half-years (2012–2018) for all of Greenland’s large-scale fisheries to determine if onboard fishery observers influence the mandatory reporting of discards. To do so, we used exact matching to compare reported discards for observed and unobserved hauls (each time a catch is recorded), thus controlling for systematic differences between monitored and unmonitored practices. After adjusting for variables that represent species caught, gear, vessel, owner, year, license, and location, we found that skippers systematically underreport discards when no observers are on board. Systematic underreporting was most pronounced in less valuable fisheries, in contrast to theoretical arguments in previous studies. The differences between reported discards from observed and unobserved fishing leads us to assume that onboard observers encourage more faithful logbook records. Thus, onboard observers play a vital role in improving information on the environmental impact of fishing and in turn, make a key contribution to sustainable fisheries management.

Noncompliance is a central challenge for conservation, but in settings with limited access to behavioral data, it can be difficult to evaluate what drives compliance. Conservationists can measure and evaluate resource users' attitudes, and in so doing, leverage a complementary, nonbehavioral measure for evaluating compliance. In Greenland, wild Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) fishers are under increasing regulatory pressure to report salmon catch because the majority of North Atlantic salmon stocks are classified as suffering. The objective of this study is to measure salmon catch reporting compliance, reporting behavior, and attitudes toward Greenland's salmon management. We surveyed Greenland's licensed salmon fishers, used an unmatched count technique to estimate the incidence of underreporting salmon catch, and linked salmon fishers' actual catch reports to their survey responses. In 2019, more than 84% of salmon fishers reported their catch and demonstrating high levels of compliance. We also found that salmon fishers did not indicate strong instrumental motivations for reporting, but exhibited moral obligations and normative, legitimacy‐based motivations to report catch. Salmon fishers found regulations to be fair, and that regulatory authorities were professional and acted honestly. Catch underreporting was also remarkably low, with 90–94% of respondents stating that they report all their catch. Joining together individuals' attitudinal and behavioral responses to conservation rules illustrates the benefits and limitations of expanding actor‐based theories of compliance. This case of already high levels of compliance offers empirical evidence for further improving fisheries compliance, and it also illustrates the limitations that fishery managers face when conserving a highly migratory species.

Fishers reporting all of their catch is key to estimating population viabilities of vulnerable, highly migratory fish stocks. However, fishery managers find it difficult to ensure that this reporting behavior takes place consistently. Wild Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) are a highly migratory and internationally contested species with a threatened conservation status. Greenland manages a fishery for Atlantic salmon, and its coastline serves as a key feeding ground in the life history of Atlantic salmon. However, salmon catch is underreported by fishers, even though they are required to report. Deterring noncompliant behavior with penalties and sending short message service (SMS) messages have been shown to increase compliance, but no known studies test their effect on compliance with catch reporting requirements. We evaluated two interventions for their effect on salmon catch reporting behavior among Greenland's salmon fishers. Salmon fishers were 41% more likely to report (p < 0.00) once a deterrence-based intervention was implemented. Fishers who received SMS reminders were 6% more likely to report salmon catch (p < 0.1). These results highlight the complementarity of nudges and command-and-control interventions to increase compliance with catch reporting requirements.