Additional information:Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. ABSTRACTThis study examines the effect of board composition on the likelihood of corporate failure in the UK. We consider both independent and non-independent (grey) non-executive directors (NEDs) to enhance our understanding of the impact of NEDs' personal or economic ties with the firm and its management on firm performance. We find that firms with a larger proportion of grey directors on their boards are less likely to fail. Furthermore, the probability of corporate failure is lower both when

Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. AbstractThis study investigates the associations between audit committee characteristics and the likelihood of auditors' going-concern decisions among UK failed firms. Specifically, we examine whether the threat posed by auditor-provided non-audit services (NAS) to auditors' reporting decisions is mediated by audit committee characteristics. We find that failed firms with higher proportions of independent non-executive directors (NEDs) and financial experts on the audit committee are more likely to receive auditor going-concern modifications prior to failure, but that there is no significant relationship between NAS fees and the likelihood of receiving a going-concern modification. The evidence further suggests that the association between NAS and auditors' reporting decisions is subject to audit committee characteristics.Where the audit committee is more independent and includes a greater proportion of financial experts, auditors providing the client with NAS are less likely to issue a standard unmodified going-concern report prior to failure. Overall, the findings provide support for corporate

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Research Question/IssueThis study investigates whether the impact of the mandatory adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on earnings management practices varies between family and non‐family firms. Specifically, we examine the effects of different family ownership configurations and the CEO family identity.Research Findings/InsightsWe find that firms in Taiwan use less accrual‐based earnings management (ABEM) under the IFRS but more real earnings management (REM). On average, IFRS adoption is less likely to result in upward ABEM and REM in family firms than in non‐family firms. However, family firms with greater family ownership, lower family cash–vote divergence, a founder CEO, or a professional CEO are more likely to promote the positive effect of the IFRS on ABEM and mitigate the negative effect of the IFRS on REM. Furthermore, these firms are less likely to substitute ABEM with REM after the transition to the IFRS.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWhile recent literature has paid increasing attention to various governance characteristics that shape management's reporting incentives and, thus, affect the consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption, we focus on family firms in which the principal–principal agency relationship between controlling owners and other shareholders is salient. We highlight the effect of family owners' different agency features in relation to a structural change in the accounting regime.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study addresses how a firm's corporate governance influences the net benefits of implementing new accounting standards. Our evidence offers insights to policymakers and capital market participants, showing that variations in family owners' reporting incentives may have different impacts on the consequences of adopting the IFRS.

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