At present, some states are undertaking military interventions in different parts of the world, contending the ‘legitimacy’ of their i006Evocation of responsibility to protect civilians from a humanitarian crisis. Discussions at international forums concerning the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are inconclusive about its legal nature and application. While some scholars and states support the doctrine of R2P as being legitimate, others challenge or take a rather sceptical view. Divergent views seem to be originating from its incompatibilities with the rules of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. What is controversial is that the supporters of R2P are mainly from the West, while objections to R2P are from developing countries mainly from West Asia or Africa. This raises concerns about the possibility of future applications of R2P in any of the countries in these regions or other developing countries. The article, analyses the legal nature of R2P in terms of the main principles of international law and other sources of international law and argues that the legitimacy and international legal effect of R2P are uncertain.

As is known, military intervention by the U.S.-led coalition was commenced in September 2014 in Syria. The justification invoked by some participants of the coalition was that the Syrian government was “unwilling or unable” to deal with Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an international terrorist group. The “unwilling or unable” test gives rise to various debates among international scholars and practitioners. Some international publicists argue that military intervention on the basis of the “unwilling or unable” test is an emerging rule of customary international law, while others are rather opposed to it. The U.S. announced its intention to withdraw its troops from Syria on 19 December 2018. This, however, does not mean an immediate cessation of operations of the U.S.-led coalition in Syria. It is expressed in the statement made on 6 February 2019 by Mike Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of State, in which he articulated that the arms cut in Syria is not a shift in mission but a strategic turn in essence. What can be inferred is that it seems unlikely that the military intervention of the U.S.-led coalition in Syria will be terminated in the near future. In fact, it arouses deep concern of humanity that the military intervention in Syria justified by the “unwilling or unable” test might recur in other regions or states. In this respect, the present article argues the compatibility of military intervention based on the “unwilling or unable” test proposed by some states, including the U.S., and some international publicists under universal principles of customary international law formation and international conventions.

Geopolitical tensions have periodically risen in the Asia-Pacific region due to territorial disputes between Japan and its neighbours over the Southern Kurils (the Northern Territories), the Diaoyu Islands (the Senkaku islands) and Tok Islet (Tok Islet (Dokdo)/ Takeshima). There is, of course, great discrepancy between the disputes over the Southern Kurils, the Diaoyu Islands and Tok Islet (Dokdo) in terms of their respective origin and legal nature, and effective control over them, and the historical and legal grounds on which the disputing states rely in their claims over the disputed territories vary widely. But what is consensual and definite is the fact that the islands in dispute were already excluded from the Japanese territory under the international legal acts deciding Japanese territory after World War II. The paper examines and analyzes Japanese reasoning behind its claim over the disputed territories in terms of relevant international legal acts relating to the delimitation of Japanese territory after World War II.

The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is a fundamental treaty providing rights and obligations that states assume in the conclusion and implementation of treaties. Some of the provisions of the Convention, however, continue to divide the legal scholarship. One of them concerns the legal definition of jus cogens provided in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The international community, particularly the International Law Commission, has exerted strenuous efforts for a long time to reach a consensus on jus cogens. Nevertheless, the legal definition of jus cogens is still open to varying interpretation among different countries and international publicists. In this light, the article analyses the legal definition of jus cogens in three aspects. First, the connotation of the concept ‘peremptory norms of general international law’ is assessed in terms of particular, general and universal international law. Second, it analyses some problems arising in understanding the non-derogability from and modifiability of jus cogens. Finally, the article discusses some issues regarding ‘acceptance and recognition’ of jus cogens by the ‘international community of states as a whole’.

No abstract