The present study investigated how people, as uninvolved social observers (i.e., those not affected by the emotion expresser’s behavior), judge hypocrisy in a target who publicly expresses their self-conscious emotions (i.e., shame and guilt) after making an immoral decision, then repeats the same immoral behavior again. Results across the two studies conducted showed that participants viewed the target as more hypocritical when the target expressed guilt (vs. shame) for their past misdeed and then committed the same act again. The present study suggests that social perceivers tend to infer expressions of guilt (and of shame to a lesser degree) as signaling future changes, which is reflected in judgments of hypocrisy. The study further discusses implications for the social functions of emotional expression and communication.

shortly before 9 a.m. on september 11, 2001, greer epstein, an executive director at Morgan stanley, received a phone call from a friend asking if she was interested in taking a cigarette break. on the elevator ride down from the 67th floor, epstein noticed a jolt but chalked it up to typical problems with the elevators. When she stepped out of the south tower, she noticed the damage done to the north tower by the first plane right about the time the second plane struck less than a dozen floors above her office (park, 2011). reflecting on the events of that day, epstein said, I never took a break before noon, it was something that happened that day. and thank god for it. I was safely out of the building when the plane hit. a fireball went through my office. had I been sitting there, who knows what would've been? (park, 2011) epstein and many other individuals that day would have lost their lives had it not been for the occurrence of coincidental events such as scheduling errors, traffic jams, and illness.

The present research investigated the relationship between meaning perceptions and the structure of counterfactual thoughts. In Study 1, participants reflected on how turning points in their lives could have turned out otherwise. Those who were instructed to engage in subtractive (e.g. If only I had not done X. . .") counterfactual thinking (SCT) about those turning points subsequently reported higher meaning perceptions than did those who engaged in additive (e.g. 'If only I had done X. . .') counterfactual thinking (ACT). In Study 2, participants who reflected upon life events from the perspective of understanding the past (versus preparing for the future) tended to engage in more SCT than ACT. Finally, in Study 3, participants engaged in more SCT than ACT about life events whose meaning was perceived as certain (as opposed to uncertain)presumably to maintain their pre-existing sense of meaning. Implications for the study of counterfactual thinking and meaning are discussed.

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