Článek aktualizuje úvahy Sigmunda Freuda o pudových kořenech válečného násilí, zejména jak je předložil ve spisku Proč válka. K zachycení významu současných proměn na poli destruktivity je navržen koncept destruktivní revoluce, jehož terminologické zachycení má poukazovat na analogii s procesem známým jako sexuální revoluce. Klíčovým aspektem hypotetické probíhající destruktivní revoluce má být zvědomění skutečnosti, že destrukce může způsobovat slast a že mezi základní destruktivní projevy patří autoagrese. Smyslem předložených úvah je nabídnout perspektivu, z níž se válečné násilí jeví jako kontraproduktivní odvedení energie našich pudových snah od jejich adekvátních cílů.

Abstrakt: Studie zkoumá možnosti filosofické interpretace euroskeptických pozic v současné politické diskuzi o Evropské unii. V nástinu seznamuje s počátky evropské filosofické skeptické tradice a s jejím oživením u vybraných postav novověkého myšlení. Hledá relevantní filosofické motivy použitelné k porozumění požadavkům euroskeptických hnutí a stran a jejich analogie ve stanoviscích, jež se objevují v současných politických debatách. S pomocí pojmů klasické skeptické teorie předkládá redefinici možných přístupů k problematice evropské integrace a srovnává ji se standardním politologickým pojetím.Klíčová slova: Evropská unie, euroskepticismus. Abstract:The present study explores the possibility of a philosophical interpretation of eurosceptical position in the current political discussion on the European Union. In outline it introduces the roots of european philosophical sceptical tradition and its rebirth by selected personalities of early modern thought. It searches relevant philosophical motifs, useful in understanding of the demands of eurosceptical movements and parties, and their analogies in the standpoints which we hear in current political debates. With the help of classical sceptical theory the paper offers a redefinition of possible approaches to the problematics of the european integration and compares it with the standard politological view.

Benedict Spinoza, the seventeenth-century rationalist philosopher, is, according to some authors, the first theorist to offer serious philosophical arguments justifying the idea of democracy as the best (and most natural) political system. Spinoza’s political philosophy is, therefore, one of the first to be examined in today’s political situation, which is often characterized by the phrase “crisis of (liberal) democracy”. This study attempts to capture the philosophical arguments used by Spinoza to support his pro-democratic conclusions, detects his initial assumptions, and illuminates what specifically should characterize a democratic regime in his imagination. Among the primary sources used for this purpose are both those writings of Spinoza that are traditionally understood as political-philosophical (Theologico-Political Treatise and Political Treatise) and Spinoza’s most famous work (Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order). Although the latter may appear distant from the issue at hand, some of the most strongly formulated relevant positions are found in it. The intention of the present study is twofold: first, to demonstrate on the example of Spinoza’s thought how inextricably the preference for a democratic regime is linked to certain philosophical premises, not only ethical and axiological but also gnoseological and ontological ones; and more importantly, second, to formulate a hypothetical answer that Spinoza would have given to the question of the crisis of democracy and the possibilities of its solution.

The aim of this study is to clarify Spinoza's concept of freedom and outline the meaning of this concept in Spinoza's philosophical system as a whole. First, I outline the position of the topic of freedom within the framework of Spinoza's philosophical teachings and its reception. Then I gradually turn to how Spinoza's topic of freedom appears in the context of ontology, ethics and political philosophy. Spinoza's philosophy is ontological-ethics and political philosophy are the application of his ontology. That is why I will start with the interpretation of its basic metaphysical notions-substance, attributes, and modes. In an ethical context, it is possible to speak of Spinozism of freedom with regard to the concept of so-called power of mind over affects, which will be the next center of interpretation. I will conclude with a summary of Spinoza's political-philosophical views on freedom.

This paper deals with the possibilities of using the ethical considerations of Baruch Spinoza in a psychotherapeutic context. I begin the interpretation by defining the basic features of Spinoza’s ethics and their connection with the whole of his philosophical system. The core of the study is the interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of affectivity and especially his concept of the transformation of passive affects into active, and what role philosophical knowledge plays in this transformation. The third part of the study then tries to show how selected points of Spinoza’s introduced ideas can be useful for psychotherapeutic work. As much as the connection between philosophical ethics and psychotherapy seems obvious to many non-experts, most professionals on both sides are vehemently opposed to it. I believe that Spinoza’s thinking is an example of how the boundaries of these disciplines can be meaningfully bridged.