We show that a firm's one-year-ahead capital investments and inventory increase (decrease) when peer firms' MD&A narratives become more optimistic (pessimistic). This finding is driven by firms that access peer firms' 10-K filings within seven days of filing, and remains after controlling for other determinants of a firm's investments as well as economic connections between the firm and peer firms. Moreover, a firm's investment response varies based on content in peer firms' MD&A narratives. For instance, a firm makes more (less) capital investments when peer firms become more optimistic in their narratives that discuss the industry and investments (competition). Our findings provide broad insights on the information content and proprietary costs of MD&A disclosures.

The release of earnings information has become less timely in recent years partly because firms increasingly disclose earnings concurrently with their periodic reports (e.g., 10‐Ks, 10‐Qs). We examine whether firms use voluntary disclosure to mitigate the negative economic consequences of less timely earnings announcements (EAs). We find that firms with less timely EAs are more likely to provide voluntary 8‐K filings over the period leading to the EA. We also find that investors’ demand for timely information, the nature of earnings news and litigation risk affect the extent to which firms provide voluntary disclosure to compensate for less timely EAs. The negative effect of less timely EAs on information asymmetry is attenuated when firms provide voluntary 8‐K filings prior to EAs. Overall, our findings suggest that firms voluntarily communicate with investors using voluntary disclosure when their EAs are less timely.

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