This article analyzes capital switching practices in the real estate development sector. The leading practitioners in Canada, the Canadian-based real estate companies, are the subject of this inquiry. The tradability and divisibility of real estate properties enhance the growing similarity between real estate properties and other financial assets. It is appropriate to talk about portable real estate portfolios because companies constantly rearrange their property composition. This article emphasizes the 'three dimensions of capital switching'. These dimensions unpack significant corporate considerations in the deployment and redeployment of capital, namely, mode of operation, property type and location. With respect to office development, the trajectory of the major real estate companies over the last 20 years has accommodated two notable shifts. First, these companies have focused on larger and newer properties, disposing of their smaller and older assets. Second, they have funneled a growing share of their capital assets into the top-tier cities of the Canadian urban system, reducing investment in other metropolitan areas and disinvesting in the small-to-medium sized cities. Copyright Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001.

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This paper critically questions the state's hostile takeover of planning regulation followed by experimentation initiated by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who has been seeking to subordinate the planning apparatus to market calculus and to short‐term political ends. To substantiate this argument, I have examined a large corpus of documents (official government documents, planning records, and court appeals and rulings, and NGO reports) and analyzed the media coverage between 2011 and 2016. By introducing fast‐track planning that is firmly controlled by the central state and focusing on the fictitious delivery of housing units, the structure of the planning regulation has dramatically changed. Further, two already‐dominant government ministries (Finance and Defense) have been significantly empowered, becoming the supervisors of the reformed planning system. In a state captivated by neoliberal fixation and embroiled in a housing crisis, the restructuring of planning governance has been a means to an end.

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