Conflicts are increasingly analysed as exhibiting a stealth complexity in which triggers and consequences are intricately linked to climate, environmental degradation and the struggle to control a finite pool of natural resources. The climate crisis is a multifaceted reality and, against this background, many pressing priorities compete with each other. The disruptive effect of climate variability and change on food systems is particularly acute and constitutes a direct and tangible threat to livelihoods globally. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate and discuss the importance of food systems under a climate crisis in exacerbating conflicts in the Sahelian region and propose interventions beyond and complementary to the usual military and security solutions. We demonstrate for the Sahel that (i) climate hazards are frequent and exposure to climate variability is high, (ii) hotspots of high climate variability and conflict exist, and (iii) impact pathways by which climate exacerbates food systems that can lead to conflicts are documented in the literature. While these three findings suggest clear links between conflict and climate, we find that (iv) current peace indices do not include climate and food systems indicators and therefore provide an uncomplete picture, and (v) food systems programming for climate adaptation has so far not explicitly considered peace and security outcomes. Furthermore, we propose that food systems programming that truly tackles the climate crisis should take more explicit account of peace and security outcomes in conflict-affected areas.

Climate continues to pose significant challenges to human existence. Notably, in the past decade, the focus on the role of climate on conflict and social unrest has gained traction in academic, development, and policy communities. This article examines the link between climate variability and conflict in Mali. It advances the argument that climate is a threat multiplier, in other words, climate indirectly affects conflict occurrence through numerous pathways. We take the view that maize production and household food security status sequentially mediate the relationship between climate variability and the different conflict types. First, we provide a brief review of the climate conflict pathways in Mali. Second, we employ the path analysis within the structural equation modeling technique to test the hypothesized pathways and answer the research questions. We use the Living Standards Measurement Study-Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA), a nationally representative data from Mali merged with time and location-specific climate and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) data. Results show that an increase in positive temperature anomalies when sequentially mediated by maize production and household food security status, increase the occurrence of the different conflict types. The results are robust to the use of negative precipitation anomalies (tendency toward less precipitation compared to the historical norm). Our findings highlight two key messages, first, the crucial role of climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies and interventions on influencing household food security status and thus reducing conflict occurrence. Second, that efforts to build peace and security should account for the role of climate in exacerbating the root causes of conflict.

The Central American Dry Corridor (CADC) is among the most climate-vulnerable regions worldwide. Climate change, commonly referred to as a “threat multiplier” of pre-existing socioeconomic issues, already undermines rural livelihoods by reducing agricultural yields and income opportunities. This paper provides a review of climate-related migration in the CADC region while identifying the specific pathways by which climate change manifests itself as a threat multiplier to migration. Different forms of human mobility (seasonal/temporal/permanent and internal/international migration) are increasingly attempted as adaptation strategies by affected households to diversify incomes and offset climate impacts. Preferred intra-regional migrant destinations tend to be less climate-vulnerable and also less violent. Notably, climate change is not isolated from socioeconomic and political migration drivers. Erosion of rural livelihoods reduces the costs of engaging in illicit coping strategies (e.g., illegal crop production) and simultaneously favours rapid urbanisation, which is linked to (forced) gang recruitment, primarily affecting the youth. These processes contribute to extraordinarily high violence levels, which are a major push factor for migration on their own, ultimately challenging state authority. Moreover, as outmigration from the region is projected to increase, the observed securitisation of borders, particularly along the USA-Mexico border and the Mexico-Guatemala border, while unfit to limit migration attempts, make migration more desperate and dangerous, allowing organised crime to step in and exploit migration as an economic undertaking. Thus, for the CADC, the depoliticised and simplistic narrative of migration serving as adaptation must be questioned. Policy coherence and state capacity for addressing climate-security-migration nexus challenges are critical needs.