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In these current times, scientifi c and technological progress is a global phenomenon. Theoretical discoveries in the fi elds of medicine, life sciences, neurosciences, cognitive science, and practical applications derived from them constitute two interconnected and complementary dimensions that create a rich and complex scenery. Furthermore, a trend of interaction and convergence between different sciences and technologies is visible. A meaningful example of this is represented by 'nanoscience' and 'nanotechnologies' that -like the other emerging technologiesdemonstrate numerous benefi cial applications, thus entailing potential benefi ts, but at the same time pose certain risks and concerns. This paper focuses on some of the risks that have arisen in the context of nanotechnologies, in order to look for and articulate a model of governance for dealing with these risks. For achieving this aim, a methodology founded on the comparison with another 'converging science'-the so-called synthetic biology (henceforth 'synbio')-has been chosen.From the structural viewpoint, the proposed analysis will be developed as follows: (a) a framework of similarities and differences between synbio and nanotechnology is offered; (b) an examination of the risks and the approaches required to deal with them is given, by means of a critical study of the different models of governance, and (c) this analysis proposes to fi nd, in the end, the most suitable and proper solution to apply in the area.As a premise, it should be noted that the focus of this paper is on health, safety and security issues. The social, political, economic and more intrinsically ethical topics, which are commonly associated with nanotechnologies and synbio, will not

Science and technology require an intervention by the law, and law is called upon to intervene in front of their evolution, and to look for proper solutions of governance and rational responses to their risks. One of the main issues to be investigated from the legal viewpoint is represented by the 'dual-use dilemma' that arises both in 'traditional' and new areas of techno-sciences. Indeed, any kind of research has the potential to be used both for bad as well as for good purposes. Therefore, it is important to reflect upon the ways to control possibly dangerous research without preventing the progress from going further. Such 'dual-use dilemma', then, entails the study of one of the fundamental freedoms in the biolaw area: the freedom of scientific research, its limits, and relationship with other rights/needs/freedoms (such the need of security). This work focuses on two areas of the techno-scientific world. One is more 'traditional', i.e. nuclear science, in whose context the reflections on 'dual-use' were born and developed, and the other one is a new emerging technology, which is synthetic biology. The aim is to understand how the freedom of scientific research could be shaped in relationship with other rights/needs/interests for dealing with 'dual-use' issues in the aforementioned areas of science and technology. KEY WORDS. Synthetic biologynuclear sciencefreedom of researchsecuritybalance. INTRODUCTION. In front of the evolution of science and technology, the law cannot remain silent, but it is called upon to change accordingly. The field that is labeled as 'biolaw' aims to cope with such challenge of finding a legal answer to the problems emerging in the techno-scientific area. Even if there is no universal agreement about what 'biolaw' means (Casabona 2011), this branch of the law entails a set of rights, freedoms and principles that aim to: (a) regulate science and technology, (b) govern, prevent and manage the risks connected to these areas,

One of the basic rules in trade law is the freedom of trade. However, such rule encounters some limitations when the object of trade is constituted by strategic items, such as dual-use items, which may have peaceful (civilian/commercial) or non peaceful/military applications. Trade of these categories of goods needs to be controlled, as they can provoke security concerns. Such control is pursued through control lists, licenses, authorizations to stakeholders of the supply chain, informationsharing and cooperation mechanisms, reports, records, declarations, screenings and sanctions as well. The paper aims at focusing on the issue of sanctions, in particular the ones established at the international level: these measures are provided for the violation of trade rules in reference to dual-use items, and/or sanctions have as an object this type of goods. The legal provisions established by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and at the United Nations level are analysed thereafter. Brief observations are offered as regards the EU framework of restrictive measures too.