The pricing of Big 4 industry leadership is examined for a sample of U.K. publicly-listed companies, and adds to the evidence from the Australian and U.S. audit markets that city-specific industry leadership commands a fee premium. There is a significant fee premium for city-specific industry leaders relative to other Big 4 auditors, but no evidence that either the top-ranked or second-ranked firm nationally commands a fee premium relative to other Big 4 auditors, after controlling for city-level industry leadership. We also test for Big 4 fee premiums relative to non-Big 4 auditors and the U.K. data suggest a three-level hierarchy based on audit fee differentials: (1) Big 4 city-specific industry leaders have the largest fees; (2) other Big 4 auditors (noncity leaders) and second-tier national firms have comparable fees that are lower than Big 4 city leaders but larger than third-tier firms; and (3) third-tier accounting firms have the lowest fees.

The accounting profession has come under increased scrutiny over recent years about the growing number of non‐audit fees received from audit clients and the possible negative impact of such fees on auditor independence. The argument advanced is that providing substantial amounts of non‐audit services to clients may make it more likely that auditors concede to the wishes of the client management when difficult judgments are made. Such concerns are particularly salient in the case of reporting decisions related to going‐concern uncertainties for financially stressed clients.  This study empirically examines audit reports provided to financially stressed companies in the United Kingdom and the magnitude of audit and non‐audit service fees paid to the company's auditors. We find that the magnitude of both audit fees and non‐audit fees are significantly associated with the issuance of a going‐concern modified audit opinion. In particular, financially stressed companies with high audit fees are more likely to receive a going‐concern modified audit opinion, whereas companies with high non‐audit fees are less likely to receive a going‐concern modified audit opinion. Additional analyses indicate that the results are generally robust across alternative model and variable specifications. Overall, evidence supports the contention that high non‐audit fees have a detrimental effect on going‐concern reporting judgments for financially stressed U.K. companies.

This study explores the effect of the association of audit firm alumni with their "alma mater" on audit prices. The tests indicate that there is a moderate reduction of up to 21% in the level of audit fee when alumni (i.e., former employees) of the incumbent audit firm sit on the client board of directors which is consistent with the engagement risk theory. This suggests that there is an 'alumni effect' in the market for audit services. The findings hold only in the large company segment of the market. The results are robust to different model specifications and alternative samples. The sample comprises all executive and non-executive directors who run the UK quoted companies and are simultaneously ICAEW qualified chartered accountants. The study's implications for the accounting profession and the regulators are also discussed. Copyright 2007 The Author Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

The NHS audit market is regulated by the Audit Commission (AC) and has unique features. We develop a model for audit fees that includes rigorous analysis of the type of auditor. Poor financial standing does not give rise to higher audit fees. Despite regulation the study supports the existence of a Big Five price premium on the audit fee, but only one firm has a premium. We found no premium due to industry specialisation. The removal of performance audit from AC regulation will require improved audit fee reporting and control.