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We consider the gas transmission network operating on the territory of the Russian Federation. This network includes gas fields, gas consumers, nodal compressor stations, underground gas storages, which, depending on the given scenario of the system operation, can act as gas sources or gas consumers. The nodes are connected by means of gas pipelines. Because natural gas is used in heat and power engineering and electricity, the gas transmission network may be exposed to terrorist threats, and the actions of intruders may be directed both at gas production facilities and gas pipelines. To simulate intruders attacks, a model of the attacker-defender type was proposed. In this model, the defender, represented by the system operator, solves the problem of finding the maximum flow to meet the needs of gas consumers. The attacker, in turn, attempts to minimize the maximum flow in the gas transmission network by excluding either nodes or gas pipelines. Gas transmission networks in Russia and Europe are very extensive, ramified, and have many bridges and reserve gas pipelines. Therefore, to inflict maximum damage to the system, attacks on cliques, that is, on several interconnected objects, are modelled. The article presents the results of test calculations, in which we identify the most significant combinations of objects in the gas transmission network in terms of the potential threat from terrorist attacks.

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This article is devoted to the definition of the most important combinations of objects in critical network infrastructures. This study was carried out using the example of the Russian gas transmission network. Since natural gas is widely used in the energy sector, the gas transmission network can be exposed to terrorist threats, and the actions of intruders can be directed at both gas fields and gas pipelines. A defender–attacker model was proposed to simulate attacks. In this model, the defender solves the maximum flow problem to satisfy the needs of gas consumers. By excluding gas pipelines, the attacker tries to minimize the maximum flow in the gas transmission network. Russian and European gas transmission networks are territorially very extensive and have a significant number of mutual intersections and redundant pipelines. Therefore, one of the approaches to inflicting maximum damage on the system is modeled as an attack on a clique. A clique in this study is several interconnected objects. The article presents the list of the most interconnected sections of main gas pipelines, the failure of which can cause the greatest damage to the system in the form of a gas shortage among consumers. Conclusions were drawn about the applicability of the maximum clique method for identifying the most important objects in network critical infrastructures.

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