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This article demonstrates the growing adaptability of Chinese foreign policy to Gulf states’ expectations around issues that implicate them directly or are relevant (such as relations with the US, and the wars in Yemen and Syria). Gulf states reacted positively because China's approach incrementally integrated local demands in its strategizing, especially by finding common ground with Gulf states despite their own differences; China has done so while not being tied to a “hegemonic idea” (i.e. it is not trying to control or define Gulf politics). China's incrementalist and non-hegemonic regional approach significantly increased Gulf states’ acceptance of its interventions, adapted to Gulf states’ expectations, and, crucially, has been altering what these states expect of major powers in general. The article concludes by proposing that unfolding Gulf politics in light of the June 2017 GCC crisis is very likely to present China with multiple opportunities to demonstrate the adroitness of its strategic choices vis-à-vis the region.

This article sheds light on the east-west international relations of the first century of the Abbasid Caliphate. It describes discernable Chinese influences on the onset and maintenance of a golden age of Islamic government in this century, distinguished for the flourishing of translation, research contributions in natural sciences and philosophy, sophistication in the fine arts, and economic productivity and prosperity. These influences were in the fields of trade, governance, artisan production, and scientific epistemological knowledge. The article argues that two interlocking factors helped create the conditions of possibility for the golden age of the Abbasid Caliphate: first, a positive disposition defined by pragmatism and accommodation by the Tang Dynasty found a counterpart in Abbasid policy; second, for the Abbasids, relations along the Silk Roads that had been developing for centuries valorized the potential of exchanges with the east, including China. The article explains the varied intensity of influences from the Silk Roads, as well as the Tang Dynasty, on the Abbasid golden age. It concludes by briefly explaining how people-to-people exchanges maintained ties, especially after the political power of both governments weakened and eventually ended.

The understanding of the differences in what a state and nonstate actors are and do in the Global South is augmented if we historicize these categories. In particular, the category of the nonstate actor is best understood when contextualized in the project of the state in which such actors operate. Building on established critical approaches, it is necessary to interrogate the a priori assumption that distinctions that frame as exclusively distinct categories of state and nonstate actors hold blanket validity for understanding politics in the Global South. A meaningful understanding of how an actor’s influence—regardless of category—is enhanced when placed in a context, and where analysis addresses strategies and actions and their effects. To this end, an actor is defined as an entity with two characteristics: it is able to develop preferences and goals, and it is able to mobilize individuals and material resources in their pursuit. Presenting the benefits of contextual analysis shows how a focus on actors’ “sovereign potentialities” (i.e., attributes such as control over territory, service provision, generation of markers of identity, and the international recognition that an actor has and through which it can impose change on its context and environment) allows for a clearer understanding of what constrains or enables actors qua actors. One way to explain the analytical purchase of this argument is via a novel reading of Hezbollah and of Lebanon’s politics, which is the party’s anchoring context. This makes it possible to analyze the profound effects of Hezbollah’s actions in Lebanon and regionally through its alliance with Syria (and Iran), its appeal to a wider Arab audience, and its confrontation with Israel. Special attention is given to Hezbollah’s actions in Lebanon, its involvement in the 2012–2013 Qusayr battle in support of the Syrian government, and its decision-making during the 2006 Israel War. This discussion will highlight Hezbollah’s state-like and non-state-like sovereign potentialities, and the factors that limit or enable its strategies in different contexts.

Kuwait's expanding engagement with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) sheds light on its strategies to meet its socioeconomic needs and navigate the Gulf's adversarial politics. The BRI presents a good case study of how the Kuwaiti leadership evaluates the benefits of and dilemmas created by asymmetric structural relationships. This article thus explores how governmental agency in strategically managing massive financial assets complicates our understanding of the vulnerability of so-called small states.