The notion of "reflexivity" has been so intimately tied to the critique of Positivism and Empiricism inIR that the emergence of post-Positivism has naturally produced the anticipation of a "reflexive turn"in IR theory. Three decades after the launch of the post-positivist critique, however, reflexive IR hasfailed to impose itself as either a clear or serious contender to mainstream scholarship. Reasons for thisfailure include the proliferation of different understandings of "reflexivity" in IR theory that entailsignificantly different projects and concerns for IR scholarship; the equation of "reflexive theory" with"critical" and "emancipatory theory" and the consequent confusion of ethical/normative issues withstrictly epistemic/theoretical ones; and the refusal to consider reflexive IR as a "research programme"concerned with empirical knowledge, not just meta-explanation. The development of reflexivity in IR theory as a sustainable cognitive and praxeological effort is nonetheless possible-and still needed.This paper suggests what taking the "reflexive turn" would really entail for IR Introduction: In his 1989 article on the 'Third Debate' in International Relations (IR), Yosef Lapid (1989:249-50) noted, after Mervyn Frost (1986:11), that '[f]or many years the international relations discipline ha[d] had the dubious honour of being among the least self-reflexive of the Western social sciences.' This diagnosis was shared by many scholars who thought it necessary to start reflecting on the epistemic and theoretical premises that subtended the discipline's predominant narratives on world politics. The critique of Positivist (American) IR scholarship has therefore naturally produced the anticipation of a 'reflexive turn' (Neufeld 1991) in IR, and in the early 1990s the view ! 1 was that 'the prospects for the development of theoretically reflexive international relations theory [were] real and significant, while the need for such theory [was] urgent' (Neufeld 1991:2). With the emergence and development of a sustained and coherent metatheoretical critique of Positivist IR, "reflexivity" has, indeed, gained a substantive

and thoughtful comments, criticisms and suggestions.

Adopting a reflexive, praxeological understanding of science that rejects the objectivist epistemic antinomy of theory and practice, this article offers two complementary Bourdieusian readings of International Relations theory that specifically aim to conceptualise the structural position of ?periphery? scholars, as well as their extant and potential ?space of possibilities? in the discipline. Grounded in a sociological appraisal of International Relations, the ?clinical? approach objectivates International Relations as a field of international practice wherein the production of theoretical knowledge results from the meeting of different socio-academic habitus and their associated positions with the objective structures of International Relations and the international system. It highlights the relation between International Relations theory and the structural (dis)positions of its authors, the conditions that allow some theories to be objectively possible, meaningful, structuring representations of the world, and the structural constraints imposed on International Relations theorists. The ?cynical? approach suggests how a ?clinical? understanding of International Relations can help marginalised, ?periphery? scholars make sense of their ?space of possibilities? within the discipline, and develop a praxeological, reflexive attitude that could turn them into efficient international agents capable of promoting different scholarly perspectives. More specifically, the article argues that their non-native habitus is a potentially subversive capital ? and hence a potential agency of structural change

This article addresses the notion of reflexivity in international theory through an attempt to transcend the dichotomy between knowledge and judgement. It intends to demonstrate that neither 'philosophical' nor 'scientific' approaches to world politics can reconcile cognitive and evaluative claims, but that such an endeavour may be envisaged within a certain conception of knowledge, science and facts. A comparison of Morton Kaplan's approach with Hans Morgenthau's and Kenneth Waltz's suggests what kind of theoretical alternatives can bring together these two seemingly incommensurable orders of discourse under a unified, foundationally reflexive epistemology.

This article addresses theproblématiqueof the subject and the subject-object dichotomy from a post-objectivist, reflexivist perspective informed by a ‘strong’ version of reflexivity. It clarifies the rationale and epistemic-ontological requirements of strong reflexivity comparatively, through a discussion of autoethnography and autobiography, taken as representatives of other variants of reflexive scholarship. By deconstructing the ontological, epistemic, and reflexive statuses of the subject in the auto-ethnographic and auto-biographical variants, the article shows that the move from objectivism to post-objectivism can entail different reconfigurations of the subject-object relation, some of which can lead to subjectivism or an implicit positivist view of the subject. Strong reflexivity provides a coherent and empowering critique of objectivism because it consistently turns the ontological fact of the social situatedness of knowledge into an epistemic principle of social-scientific research, thereby providing reflexivist scholars with a critique of objectivism from within that allows them to reclaim the philosophical, social, and ethical dimensions of objectivity rather than surrender them to the dominant neopositivist tradition.