This paper provides evidence on the minimally explored topic of abnormal returns earned by stockholders of foreign bidders seeking to acquire a target firm in the USA. Four sources of influence on abnormal returns are identified: changes in net wealth of the bidder associated with changes in exchange rates; possible value‐destroying managerial discretionary behavior by bidders with excess cash flows, as suggested by Jensen; comparative advantages for foreign bidders domiciled in relatively favorable tax jurisdictions; ownership status of the target, i.e. whether the target is an entire firm and whether it involves divested assets. The study includes 77 firms from 10 countries. The results show that stockholders of foreign bidders earn significant, negative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of an acquisition in the USA. These abnormal returns become increasingly negative over the 15 days after the announcement of the acquisition, indicating that more information about the acquisition is revealed to investors subsequent to the initial announcement. Cross‐sectional regressions indicate that relative exchange rates and cash positions explain variation in abnormal returns. A decline in the value of the dollar increases abnormal returns for the foreign bidder, thus supporting the net wealth hypothesis. The results also show that cash‐rich foreign firms tend to enjoy higher abnormal returns when making acquisitions in the USA. The result provides support for the Froot and Stein cash‐constrained hypothesis rather than for Jensen's free‐cash‐flow theory.

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The evidence in this paper supports the hypothesis that the previously documented stock price reversal following a tender offer announcement is consistent with a price pressure caused by a temporary shift in the security's demand curve. The authors came to this conclusion by redocumenting the price reversal, by finding an increase in trading volume around the tender offer announcement and expiration, by showing the increase in volume to be larger than expected from only an information effect, and by showing that short selling activity increases after the announcement and before the expiration of the tender offer.

The number of mergers in the U.S.A. increased from 2,339 in 1983 to 3,701 in 1987—an increase of 58.23 per cent. Over the same time period the value of mergers increased from $51.89 billion to $167.48 billion—an increase of 323 per cent. Merger activities of this magnitude can be expected to attract a great deal of attention, and they have.

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