ABSTRACT

Target and bidder reference points have separate and joint effects on merger deals. A firm whose stock price is more distant from its 52-week high reference point is less likely to attract bids but has a greater likelihood of being acquired by its own managers (vs unaffiliated bidders). Firm propensity to submit a bid increases if its prevailing stock price is closer to its 52-week high. When both parties' reference points are close to their current stock prices, they are more willing to complete a deal. Hostile deals result when the bidder's stock price is closer to its reference point.

No abstract

On October 16, 2009, the U.S. government charged Galleon hedge fund founder Raj Rajaratnam and five others with insider trading, in what was described by a key prosecutor overseeing the case as a "wake-up call to Wall Street and to every hedge fund manager." We find that the mean abnormal stock price runup of targets (a measure of informed trading) during the 26 months since the inception of the Galleon case declined from 5.12% to 2.84%. The early evidence strongly suggests that the Galleon case has sent a clear signal to the traders, and that the traders are listening.

No abstract