Abstract. On Service-Oriented Architectures (SOAs), the mechanism for run-time discovery and selection of services may conflict with the need to make sure that business process instances satisfy their reliability requirements. In this paper we describe a certification scheme based on machine-readable reliability certificates that will enable run-time negotiation. Service reliability is afforded by means of reliability patterns. Our certificates describe the reliability mechanism implemented by a service and the reliability pattern used to implement such a mechanism. Digital signature is used to associate the reliability claim contained in each certificate with the party (service supplier or accredited third-party) taking responsibility for it.

This paper addresses the challenge of measuring security, understood as a system property, of cyberphysical systems, in the category of similar properties, such as safety and reliability. First, it attempts to define precisely what security, as a system property, really is. Then, an application context is presented, in terms of an attack surface in cyberphysical systems. Contemporary approaches related to the principles of measuring software properties are also discussed, with emphasis on building models. These concepts are illustrated in several case studies, based on previous work of the authors, to conduct experimental security measurements.

An important aspect for the acceptance of Service-Oriented Architectures is having convenient ways to help designers build secure applications. Numerous standards define ways to apply security in web services. However, these standards are rather complex and sometimes overlap, which makes them hard to use and may produce inconsistencies. Representing them as patterns makes them easier to understand, to compare to other patterns, to discover inconsistencies, and to use them to build secure web services applications. Security patterns abstract the key aspects of a security mechanism and can thus be applied by non-experts. We survey here our work on security patterns for web services and their standards and we put them in perspective with respect to each other and to more fundamental patterns. We also consider other patterns for web services security. All the patterns described here have been previously published, we only show here one of them in detail as an illustration of our style for writing patterns. Our main purpose here is to enumerate them, show their use, and show how they relate to each other

We are proposing a systematic approach to building reliable distributed applications. The main objective of this approach is to consider reliability from application inception to completion, adding reliability patterns along the lifecycle and in all architectural layers. We start by enumerating the possible failures of the application, considering every activity in the use cases of the application. The identified failures are then handled by applying reliability policies. We evaluate the benefits of this approach and compare our approach to others.

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