Transnational trade rules endow authoritarians and armed groups with unaccountable power in states rich with natural resources. This structural flaw in international trade generates the 'resource curse' phenomena that have driven many of the world's most serious crises since the 1970s. Attempts to curtail this unaccountable power from outside resource-rich states have not been successful, and crises caused by this structural flaw continue to plague the global community. The shipping sector provides a promising location for reforms to fight the resource curse, as it is a sector where extensive, unified and enforceable regulations have long been established. Policy Implications• States should incentivize shipping firms not to carry resources sold by authoritarians, armed groups, and others who sell the resources beyond any accountability to the people of the country of export.• States should pass domestic legislation implementing vessel blacklists, as well as banking and insurance restrictions, on shipping firms that carry resources from authoritarian and failed states.• Individual and institutional investors should use a Clean Hands Shipping Index to shift their portfolios away from firms that carry more goods from authoritarian and failed states.

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Recent work in republican political theory has identified various forms of domination in the structures and relations of capitalist societies. A notable absence in much of this work is the concept of exploitation, which is generally treated as a predictable outcome of certain kinds of domination. This paper argues that the concept of exploitation can instead be conceived as a form of structural domination, understood in republican terms, and that adopting this conception has important implications for republican attempts to theorise modern capitalist societies. Building on existing domination accounts of exploitation, we argue that exploitation is a form of structurally constituted domination that enables a systemic illegitimate extraction ofvalue. However, in contrast to competing accounts, domination is understood here in the republican terms of subjection to arbitrary power. We show that conceiving of domination in these terms not only makes the concept easily accessible from within a republican framework, but has advantages over competing accounts. Our argument also demonstrates why using the concept of exploitation will be useful for republican theorists. We show that a polity based on exploitative relations of production is antithetical to key republican commitments. These asymmetric power relationships undermine the economic and political independence of citizens and, crucially, constrain the political and economic ends that a polity will be effectively able to pursue. As such, exploitation should be a central preoccupation of republican political economy.