Tsalavoutas I (2011) Transition to IFRS and compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements: What is the signal?, Advances in Accounting, 27 (2), pp. 390-405. Third, this study makes a methodological contribution on measuring compliance with all IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements by using two different index methods (cf. Street and Gray, 2001; and pointing out the different conclusions may be drawn as a result. This is the peer reviewed version of this article NOTICE: this is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in Advances in

a b s t r a c tWe examine the effect of family control on IFRS mandatory disclosure levels, and the valuation implications of these disclosure levels, for Malaysian companies. We find that family control is related negatively to disclosure and that compliance levels are not value relevant. These findings suggest that agency theory predictions and theories linking common law legal systems to high quality financial reporting require refining in certain national contexts. Where Type 2 agency problems dominate, institutional arrangements intended to enhance financial reporting quality aimed at mitigating Type 1 problems in developed markets may have limited effect in less developed jurisdictions.

Theory suggests that increased levels of corporate disclosure lead to a decrease in cost of equity via the reduction of estimation risk. We examine compliance levels with IFRS 3 and IAS 36 mandated goodwill related disclosure and their association with firms’ implied cost of equity capital (ICC). Using a sample of European firms for the period 2008 to 2011, we find a median compliance level of about 83% and significant differences in compliance levels across firms and time. Non-compliance relates mostly to proprietary information and information that reveals managers’ judgment and expectations. Overall, we find a statistically significant negative relationship between the ICC and compliance with mandated goodwill related disclosure. Further, we split the sample between firms meeting (or not) market expectations about the recognition of a goodwill impairment loss in a given year to study whether variation in compliance levels mainly plays a confirmatory or a mediatory role. We find the latter: higher compliance levels matter only for the sub-sample of firms that do not meet market expectations regarding goodwill impairment. Finally, our results hold only in countries where enforcement is strong