The paper surveys theoretical models of job mobility with special attention to promotion and career profiles. The review is ordered according to the assumptions concerning information on workers' relevant characteristics (i.e. perfect vs. imperfect information, private vs. public information) and technology (i.e. single-job models vs. many-job models). JEL classification: D21, J31, L23

The paper is concerned with dynamic job assignment when observed performance is an imperfect signal of the worker's type. When the rate of learning from past performance depends upon the particular job performed, promotion can be due to good performance only at a job for which the resulting probability of mistaking a low-ability type for a high-ability type is higher than for the job the worker is upgraded to. Income risk can be greater for old workers than for young workers. The length of the worker's active life is relevant for job mobility notwithstanding optimal myopic procedures for job assignment. The dynamic perspective induced by learning can generate new forms of opportunism.

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In this paper we analyse the so-called "planning contracts" which are adopted for the Italian Mezzogiorno from the point of view of the theory of incentives. The Italian Government is the principal who wants to promote economic development in Southern regions of the country. Large firms, both Italian or foreign, are the agents who are keen on locating new plants or restructuring existing ones, provided that expected profits are sufficiently high. Incentives are necessary in order to smooth out any extra-costs encountered when investing and operating in a less favourable environment. We suggest that planning contracts can be interpreted as a case of procurement where Government is the sole buyer of a public good. We refer to a model by Laffont and Tirole (1993) in order to show that under conditions which may be relevant for the Italian experience, firms will enjoy rents that imply allocative inefficiency because of an excess of investment.