The conflict between pro-self and pro-social behaviour is at the core of many key problems of our time, as, for example, the reduction of air pollution and the redistribution of scarce resources. For the well-being of our societies, it is thus crucial to find mechanisms to promote pro-social choices over egoistic ones. Particularly important, because cheap and easy to implement, are those mechanisms that can change people’s behaviour without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives, the so-called “nudges”. Previous research has found that moral nudges (e.g., making norms salient) can promote pro-social behaviour. However, little is known about whether their effect persists over time and spills across context. This question is key in light of research showing that pro-social actions are often followed by selfish actions, thus suggesting that some moral manipulations may backfire. Here we present a class of simple moral nudges that have a great positive impact on pro-sociality. In Studies 1–4 (total N = 1,400), we use economic games to demonstrate that asking subjects to self-report “what they think is the morally right thing to do” does not only increase pro-sociality in the choice immediately after, but also in subsequent choices, and even when the social context changes. In Study 5, we explore whether moral nudges promote charity donations to humanitarian organisations in a large (N = 1,800) crowdfunding campaign. We find that, in this context, moral nudges increase donations by about 44 percent.

Theory of mind refers to the human capacity for reasoning about others' mental states based on observations of their actions and unfolding events. This type of reasoning is notorious in the cognitive science literature for its presumed computational intractability. A possible reason could be that it may involve higher-order thinking (e.g., 'you believe that I believe that you believe'). To investigate this we formalize theory of mind reasoning as updating of beliefs about beliefs using dynamic epistemic logic, as this formalism allows to parameterize 'order of thinking.' We prove that theory of mind reasoning, so formalized, indeed is intractable (specifically, PSPACE-complete). Using parameterized complexity we prove, however, that the 'order parameter' is not a source of intractability. We furthermore consider a set of alternative parameters and investigate which of them are sources of intractability. We discuss the implications of these results for the understanding of theory of mind.

Energy is the common currency of life. To guarantee a homeostatic supply of energy, multiple neuro-endocrine systems have evolved in vertebrates; systems that regulate food intake, metabolism, and distribution of energy. Even subtle (lasting) dysregulation of the delicate balance of energy intake and expenditure may result in severe pathologies. Feeding-related pathologies have fueled research on mammals, including of course the human species. The mechanisms regulating food intake and body mass are well-characterized in these vertebrates. The majority of animal life is ectothermic, only birds and mammals are endotherms. What can we learn from a (comparative) study on energy homeostasis in teleostean fishes, ectotherms, with a very different energy budget and expenditure? We present several adaptation strategies in fish. In recent years, the components that regulate food intake in fishes have been identified. Although there is homology of the major genetic machinery with mammals (i.e., there is a vertebrate blueprint), in many cases this does not imply analogy. Although both mammals and fish must gain their energy from food, the expenditure of the energy obtained is different. Mammals need to spend vast amounts of energy to maintain body temperature; fishes seem to utilize a broader metabolic range to their advantage. In this review, we briefly discuss ecto- and endothermy and their consequences for energy balance. Next, we argue that the evolution of endothermy and its (dis-)advantages may explain very different strategies in endocrine regulation of energy homeostasis among vertebrates. We follow a comparative and evolutionary line of thought: we discuss similarities and differences between fish and mammals. Moreover, given the extraordinary radiation of teleostean fishes (with an estimated number of 33,400 contemporary species, or over 50% of vertebrate life forms), we also compare strategies in energy homeostasis between teleostean species. We present recent developments in the field of (neuro)endocrine regulation of energy balance in teleosts, with a focus on leptin.

In this paper we introduce a computational-level model of theory of mind (ToM) based on dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), and we analyze its computational complexity. The model is a special case of DEL model checking. We provide a parameterized complexity analysis, considering several aspects of DEL (e.g., number of agents, size of preconditions, etc.) as parameters. We show that model checking for DEL is PSPACE-hard, also when restricted to single-pointed models and S5 relations, thereby solving an open problem in the literature. Our approach is aimed at formalizing current intractability claims in the cognitive science literature regarding computational models of ToM. * This research has been carried out in the context of the first author's master's thesis [37]. In cognitive science, often Marr's [33] tri-level distinction between computational-level ("what is the nature of the problem being solved?"), algorithmic-level ("what is the algorithm used for solving the problem?"), and implementational-level ("how is the algorithm physically realized?") is used to distinguish different levels of computational cognitive explanations. In this paper, we will focus on computational-level models of ToM and their computational complexity.