In the beginning of the XX century, political, economic, and demographic revolutions contributed to the emergence of extraordinary people. In architecture, they were Frank Lloyd Wright, Antonio Gaudí, Frank Owen Gary, Le Corbusier, Hugo Hering, Alvar Aalto, Hans Sharun, Walter Burley Griffin, and Marion Mahony Griffin. Each of them was given a lot of attention in the media resources and their creativity was researched in different fields of knowledge. However, Rudolf Steiner’s work remains controversial to this day. Although many of the architects mentioned above enthusiastically commented on Steiner’s architectural works, there was always ambiguity in the perception of this mystic architect. Such a careful attitude to the work of the architect is due primarily to his worldview, his extraordinary approach to art and architecture in particular, because it is in architecture that Steiner was able to implement the basic tenets of anthroposophy, which he founded. The purpose of this study is to determine the content of the spatial structure of Steiner’s architecture, which makes it unique in the history of architectural heritage. The authors offer the scientific community the first article in a series of articles on the anthroposophical architecture of Rudolf Steiner and the philosophical concept that influenced the formation of this architecture.

Adnotacja. W zachodnioeuropejskiej egzystencjalistycznej filozofii prawa przedstawiono różnorodność podejść do rozwiązywania problemów prawa. Usystematyzowane przedstawienie spektrum sposobów egzystencjalistycznego rozumienia prawa wymaga podkreślenia klasyfikacyjnych kryteriów, które pozwoliłyby na rozróżnienie między istniejącymi obszarami egzystencjalistycznej filozofii prawa i odróżnienie ich od innych nauk filozoficzno-prawnych. Mając to na uwadze, celem naszego badania będzie próba opracowania wspomnianej klasyfikacji na materiałach zachodnioeuropejskich koncepcji filozoficzno-prawnych XX wieku. Artykuł analizuje istniejące podejścia do klasyfikacji podejść filozoficzno-prawnych i koncepcji prawa. Zgodnie z wynikami badań filozoficzno-prawne koncepcje egzystencjalnego kierunku są podzielone na: 1) egzystencjonalne miejsce wdrożenia prawdziwego (egzystencjalnego) prawa; 2) czynniki determinujące kształtowanie rzeczywistego prawa; 3) charakter doświadczenia prawnego niezbędnego do opracowania decyzji prawnej; 4) rola państwowych instytucji normatywnych w opracowaniu egzystencjalnej decyzji prawnej; 5) stosunki form społecznej egzystencji człowieka do jego rzeczywistej egzystencji; 6) znaczenie społecznej roli osoby, która powinna stanowić egzystencjalny wymóg prawny; 7) stopień socjologizacji pojęć.Słowa kluczowe: egzystencjalistyczna filozofia prawa, egzystencja, prawo rzeczywiste, nieklasyczna filozofia prawa, podejście przyrodniczo-prawne w prawoznawstwie, podejście socjologiczne w prawoznawstwie.

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The article is devoted to the analysis of the actual judicial practice of the Supreme Court regarding the interpretation and application of the concept of “legitimate expectations.” For the purpose of a detailed analysis of this institute, the scope of its application by the Supreme Court is conditionally divided by the author into three separate blocks: 1) regarding the protection of property rights − reasonable expectations as a component of the concept of “property;” 2) regarding the proper implementation of their own competence by subjects of authority; and 3) regarding the good faith and reasonable behavior of equal participants in legal relations. It has been established that each of these blocks has an excellent understanding of the idea of legitimate expectations, the order and conditions of its application by the Court. Two polar positions of the Court are followed: if in one case the Court satisfies the claim, recognizing that legitimate expectations are violated, referring to their rootedness in the very essence of the legal relationship (i.e. regardless of the legal norm), then in the other case − it refuses to satisfy the claim due to the lack of normative consolidation of the right or interest, for which such an expectation could arise. The author substantiates the statement that the inconsistency of the Supreme Court, the inconsistency of its positions regarding the application of the concept of legitimate expectations is largely due to the lack of an appropriate doctrinal foundation. The idea of “reasonable”/“natural”/“legitimate” expectations proposed by the existentialist legal philosopher Werner Maihofer (1918–2009) could, in the author’s opinion, become this doctrinal core and contribute to the unification of the understanding of the category of legitimate expectation in judicial practice. A separate aspect of the research was the clarification of the presence/absence of connections between the modern judicial interpretation of the concept of “legitimate expectations” and its doctrinal interpretation − the views of Maihofer and establishing the possibility of applying the ideas of the German philosopher of law for the doctrinal justification of the institution of legitimate expectations within those limits and at preservation of those contents which are necessary and sufficient for effective legal protection. In the investigation proposed by the author, the need to take into account in the judicial practice of the Supreme Court the arguments of the German philosopher of law regarding legality and the need to protect such an expectation that arose as a result of established and desirable or permissible behavior in the social community, which, however, is not supported by a legislative norm. Moreover, the application of such an approach should be the basis of all positions of the Court in which we are talking about legitimate expectations, regardless of whether such expectations arose on the basis of an existing right or interest, or a potential, “future” right, or related they are related to the powerful activity of authorized subjects, or arose on the basis of private law relations, etc.