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There is a large body of evidence that the belief in a just world (BJW) affects people's behaviors and attitudes, either through secondary victimization of innocent victims or the promotion of helping behavior. In this article, we aim to address the normativity of the very expression of BJW. Results of two experimental studies show that the expression of a higher degree of BJW is more socially valued than that of a lower one. We argue that this pattern should not only be seen as deriving from intrapersonal motivation to see the world as a predictable place, but also as a norm which seems to be perceived as having both social utility and desirability.

Framed by the Belief in a Just World theory (BJW; Lerner, M. J. (1980). Belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum Publishing Corporation), this article presents two studies that analyze people's reactions to the suffering of victims belonging to an ingroup and an outgroup. In Study 1, participants viewed a videotaped film containing the victimization story. The victim was presented as a non-categorized, ingroup or outgroup (Gypsy) victim. Threat to BJW was measured using the modified Stroop task developed by Hafer (J Pers Soc Psychol 79: [165][166][167][168][169][170][171][172][173] 2000). In the second study, a non-victimization story was introduced and a 2 (victim, non-victim) 9 2 (ingroup, outgroup) between-subjects design was used. Both studies show that the ingroup victim is more threatening to the BJW than the outgroup victim. The expected secondary victimization of the ingroup victim was only obtained in the second study when a non-obtrusive derogation measure was used.