Owing to different ideas about what counts as an anaphor subject to Condition A, two influential but superficially incompatible versions of Condition A of binding theory have coexisted: Chomsky’s (1986) version, and versions of predicate-based binding theories defended by Pollard and Sag (1992) and Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and modified in various ways since ( Pollard 2005 , Reuland 2011 ). Using inanimate anaphors to independently control for sensitivity to Condition A without the confound of logophoricity, we show that Condition A must be checked at the syntax-interpretation interface and that Chomsky’s (1986) version (an anaphor must be bound within the smallest complete functional complex containing it and a possible binder) is nearly correct, with one amendment: a tensed TP boundary is opaque to the search for an antecedent. Given these results, we argue that Condition A should be reduced to phase theory and we outline how this can be done.

In many unrelated languages, the same anaphor is either subject to Condition A of the binding theory, or exempt from it but with specific interpretive properties. On the basis of French data and crosslinguistic comparisons, I first show that such exempt anaphors must be anteceded by logophoric centers. Elaborating on but modifying Sells 1987, I provide specific tests to argue that these logophoric antecedents can be classified into two kinds of perspective centers, attitude holders and empathy loci, thus reducing logophoricity to mental perspective. Next, I propose to derive the logophoricity of exempt anaphors from the following hypothesis: seemingly exempt anaphors are in fact bound by silent logophoric pronouns introduced by syntactically represented logophoric operators within their local domain. Crucially, this hypothesis, which is independently supported by exhaustive coreference constraints on locally cooccurring exempt anaphors, also accounts for their apparent exemption from Condition A, reanalyzed here as local binding by a silent logophoric binder.

Cross‐linguistically, long‐distance reflexives do not form a unitary phenomenon but come in a variety of subtypes: as long‐distance bound anaphors, as pronominals, or as entities of an intermediate category. This chapter focuses on the first subtype and on Chinese and some other Asian languages: it describes the prominent syntactic and interpretive properties of long‐distance reflexives and addresses theoretical questions about their analysis and typological features and about the role of discourse. The interpretive properties of long‐distance reflexives bear remarkable similarities to those of logophoric pronouns. We clarify the notion of logophoricity as used in African linguistics and in formal semantics and situate a grammatical account of bound‐anaphor long‐distance reflexives that interfaces with notions of logophoricity, attitudes de se, consciousness and perspectivity. The distribution and reference of long‐distance reflexives are subject to syntactic and discourse/pragmatic restrictions that can be quite complex. It is argued, however, that the core patterns observed can be explained through an analysis according to which the property of long‐distance antecedence is only apparent, since both the movement of the long‐distance reflexive to the edge of its local domain and the predication relation between the edge position and the ultimate antecedent are local. We consider some well‐known properties of long‐distance reflexives in Chinese (monomorphemicity, subject orientation, and blocking effects) and explore the way they may follow from grammatical or discourse‐pragmatic principles. We also provide a detailed discussion of the various proposals for the interpretation of long‐distance reflexives, capitalizing on three approaches that make crucial use of a silent operator position on the left edge of the long‐distance reflexive's local domain (a notion along the lines of the traditional governing category). We compare two versions of covert movement (head movement and XP‐movement) in detail, in addition to the alternative of a base‐merged operator position.

The general goal of this paper is to investigate the structure of our unconscious mental representation of dance: we do not perceive dance as an unanalyzed flow of movement, but we unconsciously create a mental representation regulated by structural principles. Specifically, this article examines local grouping principles in dance perception inspired by Lerdahl and Jackendoff's ( 1983 ) approach to musical grouping. I spell out the basic perceptual dimensions at work in basic human movement perception, and on that basis, I propose six principles of change that determine group boundaries in dance (change of body part, orientation, level, direction, speed, quality). I experimentally test the relevance and interaction of these principles, and find that they are organized on a scale of relative strength. This experiment thus supports the hypothesis that grouping is a general cognitive capacity applying across domains and modalities, and shows how specific grouping principles are stated in relation to modality-specific and domain-specific dimensions. More generally, it takes a step toward the development of a generative theory of dance that should help extend the research avenue of comparing complex temporal cognitive activities across modalities (visual, auditory) and purposes (referential, non-referential), which so far involves spoken language, signed language and music.

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