Grammatical theories of Scalar Implicatures make use of an exhaustivity operator exh, which asserts the conjunction of the prejacent with the negation of excludable alternatives. We present a new Grammatical theory of Scalar Implicatures according to which exh is replaced with pex, an operator that contributes its prejacent as asserted content, but the negation of scalar alternatives at a non-at-issue level of meaning. We show that by treating this non-at-issue level as a presupposition, this theory resolves a number of empirical challenges faced by the old formulation of exh (as well as by standard neo-Gricean theories). The empirical challenges include projection of scalar implicatures from certain embedded environments ('some under some' sentences, some under negative factives), their restricted distribution under negation, and the existence of common ground-mismatching and oddness-inducing implicatures. We argue that these puzzles have a uniform solution given a pex-based Grammatical theory of implicatures and some independently motivated principles concerning presupposition projection, cancellation and accommodation.

We reply to Erlewine and Kotek’s (2018) claim that the phenomenon of covariation under focus ( Tanglewood sentences; Kratzer 1991 ) is subject to syntactic islands and that it should therefore be handled by a focus movement theory (contra Kratzer’s view). We present novel data that are at odds with Erlewine and Kotek’s conclusions and demonstrate the necessity of an island-insensitive mechanism to capture focus covariation. We revisit Erlewine and Kotek’s main arguments against such a system and show that they are systematically confounded. Moreover, removing the confounds cancels the force of the arguments, corroborating the central point of this article.

Analyses of scope reconstruction typically fall into two competing approaches: ‘semanticreconstruction’, which derives non-surface scope using semantic mechanisms, and ‘syntacticreconstruction’, which derives it by positing additional syntactic representations at thelevel of Logical Form. Grosu and Krifka (2007) proposed a semantic-reconstruction analysisfor relative clauses like the gifted mathematician that Dan claims he is, in which the relativehead NP can be interpreted in the scope of a lower intensional quantifier. Their analysis relieson type-shifting the relative head into a predicate of functions. We develop an alternativeanalysis for such relative clauses that replaces type-shifting with syntactic reconstruction. Thecompeting analyses diverge in their predictions regarding scope possibilities in head-externalrelative clauses. We use Hebrew resumptive pronouns, which disambiguate a relative clausein favor of the head-external structure, to show that the prediction of syntactic reconstructionis correct. This result suggests that certain type-shifting operations are not made available byUniversal Grammar.Keywords: relative clauses, scope, reconstruction, type-shifting, de dicto, intensional quantifiers,binding, resumptive pronouns.

In this paper we compare CP disjunction to TP disjunction and CP conjunction to TP conjunction, and conclude that CPs and TPs do not have identical meanings (cf. similar observations reported in Szabolcsi 1997, 2016; Bjorkman 2013). We argue that this result is incompatible with the view that the CP layer of embedded clauses is semantically vacuous. We propose that the differences between CPs and TPs can be explained under a particular implementation of Kratzer's approach to the semantics of clausal embedding (Kratzer 2006, 2016; Bogal-Allbritten 2016, 2017; Moulton 2009, 2015; Elliott 2017), according to which CPs denote predicates of events whose content equals the embedded proposition.

Based on the scope possibilities of pre-DP only relative to modals and their interaction with ellipsis, we provide a new argument (following Benbaji 2021) for a theory according to which only is always a propositional operator at LF, despite surface appearance.