Many studies on decision-making in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 claim that a Groupthink syndrome led to the faulty assessment and processing of information prior to the Yom Kippur War.In this paper, based on official transcripts of the meetings held on the morning of October 6, 1973 in the office of then Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and in the office of then Prime Minister Golda Meir, and based on the Agranat Report (for inquiry into the 1973 war), we show that the wellknown Groupthink syndrome that characterized decision-making until the evening of October 5, 1973changed in the early morning of October 6, 1973 to a Polythink syndrome -a polarized and divided decision-making dynamic among members of the decision unit. Important theoretical insights and policy implications are derived from this case study.

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