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We analyze how incumbents in technology-driven industries are influenced by founders' reputation and status when considering strategic alliances with newly emerging firms. We theorize that reputation and status represent two distinct components of perceived quality that exert independent and interdependent effects on alliance formation. Using literature on impression formation processes to derive predictions of signal congruence, we argue that the independent effects of reputation and status are amplified when the two are congruent, and that the effect of negative congruence (both reputation and status are low) is stronger than positive congruence (both are high). We find support for our arguments based on panel data on alliances between pharma and biotech firms, using data on biotech scientists' research output (reputation) and university attended (status).

This paper examines the adjustments firms make to the composition of their portfolios of technology‐sourcing vehicles (i.e., alliance, acquisition, or go‐it‐alone) in response to poor innovative performance. We advance a behavioral perspective on the make/buy/ally question, suggesting that differences in financial slack will generate different portfolio decisions. Specifically, we posit that firms with greater levels of financial slack are more likely to respond to poor innovative performance by opting for (1) greater vehicle diversification, and (2) new sourcing vehicles, while firms with less financial slack will respond by (1) downscoping their portfolio of sourcing vehicles, and (2) reverting to more familiar vehicles. We find support for our predictions using extensive data from the population of U.S. public pharmaceutical firms from 1992 to 2006. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Drawing from theory and research on interpersonal attraction, as well as interviews with 42 directors of large U.S. industrial and service fi rms, we identifi ed a set of social infl uence tactics that are less likely to be interpreted by the infl uence target as manipulative or political in intent and are therefore more likely to engender social infl uence. We consider who among top managers and directors of large fi rms is most likely to exercise such tactics and how their use affects the likelihood of garnering board appointments at other fi rms. An analysis of survey data on interpersonal infl uence behavior from a large sample of managers and chief executive offi cers (CEOs) at Forbes 500 companies strongly supports our theoretical arguments: managers' and directors' ingratiatory behavior toward colleagues is more likely to yield board appointments at other fi rms to the extent that it comprises relatively subtle forms of fl attery and opinion conformity, which our theory suggests are less likely to elicit cynical attributions of motive. Supplementary analyses also indicate that these relationships are mediated by an increased likelihood of receiving a colleague's recommendation for the appointment. Moreover, we theorize and fi nd that managers and directors who have a background in politics, law, or sales, or an upper-class background, are more sophisticated and successful in their ingratiatory behavior. • Political perspectives on corporate leadership and governance have traditionally focused on structural sources of power. Studies have examined, for instance, how variation in the formal and social structure of boards of directors can help explain the level and form of chief executive offi cer (CEO) compensation, perquisites, and other outcomes that indicate the power of top managers to satisfy their personal preferences (for a review, see Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009). Many studies have also suggested how managers and directors who occupy central positions in the board interlock network can leverage their social structural power to acquire a range of benefi ts, including higher levels of pay, additional board seats, and prestigious positions in the public sphere (Useem, 1984;Davis, 2003Davis, , 2005; for a review, see Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009). A growing literature has complemented the traditional focus on structural sources of power in corporate governance by examining managers' use of social infl uence tactics to further their personal interests or benefi t their fi rms. For example, several studies have examined whether ingratiation and persuasion tactics by managers can explain positive performance evaluations and generous pay increases (e.