Apstrakt: Misao o obrazovanju odraslih, kao važan dio filozofskih razmatranja, pronalazimo kod skoro svih značajnih mislilaca antičke Grčke. Tako i Epikurova filozofska škola, odnosno "Vrt", nudi sveobuhvatan i permanentan obrazovni proces, čiji se krajnji cilj ogleda u jednoj vrsti racionalno promišljenog i individualnog uživanja. U tekstu se iznosi istorijska analiza pojma hedonizma kroz prizmu shvatanja Aristipa i Platona, koja svoj konačan oblik dobija kod Epikura. Epikurejski obrazovni proces teži dostizanju uživanja koje se identifikuje sa mentalnom neuznemirenošću i odsustvom fizičkih bolova. Da bi se dostigao taj nivo, neophodno je sprovesti sistematičan i cjeloživotni obrazovni proces koji je ujedno relaksirajući i interesantan, kakvim ga je Epikur i smatrao.

The following paper is an attempt to speculate about the potential of liminality for adult learning by relating it to the existing concept of the "pedagogy of the event" which challenges the imperative for pedagogy to maximize the effects of teaching and learning by achieving predefined learning outcomes. As opposed to outcome-based education, "pedagogy of the event" is concerned with the unknown, and learning involves a move into a new or modified ontological state. Within this paper, a philosophical basis for the idea of threshold for learning process is outlined and some of the implications on education are presented. We conclude with the notion that liminality in education, as understood within the concept of pedagogy of the event, challenges normalizing and disciplining educational practices by creating radical openness towards the unknown.

We commence this paper with Foucault's theory of the technologies of the self and the approach to analysing their function in adult education. In exploring the mechanism of control, of particular importance is the point of intersection of power, examining, confiding, science and experts or specialists and the formation of the self. We shall attempt to clarify such relations, particularly the connection of the technology of the self and education. The adult learner is perceived as an active learner and is expected to provide constant reflexion on their previous experience which has turned into raw material honed by critical analysis. It is presupposed that such action is empowering and that talking about oneself influences the liberation of an individual. In the past decade, various societal spheres saw a more pronounced neoliberal position, which also applies to the sphere of education. Consequently, we witness the growing and more frequent transfer of responsibility to the subject who ought to develop certain skills, regardless of whether they are intended for living or working. Spurred by growing insecurities and global unpredictability, the individual is invited to continually hone their skills and reinvent themselves so as to adapt to changes. Lifelong learning has become a standard and requirement, not just a right. Such a learning process oftentimes includes self-knowledge that is inevitably playing out in relation to current modes of truth. By producing themselves, the subject is also becoming submissive at the same time. In this work, we suggest that the practices of learning must therefore be what Foucault called technologies of the self, whereas the description and argumentation of this statement is at the crux of this paper.

Epicurean epistemology, which gives perception full credibility as a key factor and an infallible source of receiving information regarding the external word, is completely dependable on materialist-atomistic view of natural science. As such, it is fundamental for a clear understanding of Epicurus' ethical ideas. This paper seeks to reconstruct his position and subsume it under one of the contemporary theories of perception, as an apologetic view on Epicurus and his, at first glance, rigid standpoints. Insistence on the truth of all perceptions is attempted to be alleviated and understood by modern perspective. Thus, classifying Epicurean views of perception as a certain form of indirect realism provides to the seemingly unacceptable Epicurus' theory of perception a shape which may be plausible and acceptable.

In this paper, we analyze the concept of pleasure in the period from 5th to 3rd century BC, and the development and understanding of this concept, from its officially first use in the Cyrenean philosophical discourses, up to the Epicurean discussions, which give pleasure a privileged status. Plato?s thoughts on pleasure are certainly not of any essential interest in his writings, but they are analyzed briefly here, because they may contribute to the more complete understanding of the attitude towards pleasure that was dominant in his time. This paper should yield, in addition to a historical perspective concerning the various interpretations and accounts of pleasure, a certain apology of the Epicurean account of pleasure. A hypothesis may be especially helpful, according to which Epicurus does not conceive pleasure as a mental state, but rather as an affective component of the corresponding mental states.