BB84 (Bennett and Brassard 1984) is one of the well known protocols of quantum keys distribution. It is built to allow two interlocutors commonly called Alice and Bob to share two similar binary keys and to detect the eavesdropper presence (the eavesdropper is commonly called Eve). However, Eve presence in a disturbed environment causes errors to the sifted keys and decreases the amount of secure information between Alice and Bob. One of the most important stages in BB84 protocol is to decide by using error probability estimation if we can continue the protocol phases or no. Indeed, this decision is function of some factors like: what is the amount of information that we will lose in the error correction phase? What is the degree of errors detected in our sifted keys? What is the origin of these errors: Eve strategy or the channel disturbance? For these reasons, we will study in this study some conditions to stop BB84 protocol in the context of depolarizing channel. We implement two types of eavesdropping strategy: Intercept and Resend and Cloning Attack.

We investigate the counterparts of random walks in universal quantum computing and their implementation using standard quantum circuits. Quantum walks have been recently well investigated for traversing graphs with certain oracles. We focus our study on traversing a 1D graph, namely a circle, and show how to implement a discrete-time quantum walk in quantum circuits built with universal CNOT and single qubit gates. We review elementary quantum gates and circuit decomposition techniques and propose a generalized version of all CNOT-based circuits of the quantum walk. We simulated these circuits on five different qubits IBM-Q quantum devices. This quantum computer has nonperfect gates based on superconducting qubits, and, therefore, we analyzed the impact of the CNOT errors and CNOT-depth on the fidelity of the circuit.