This book presents a new approach to epistemology (the theory of human knowledge and reasoning). Its approach aims to liberate epistemology from the scholastic debates of standard analytic epistemology, and treat it as a branch of the philosophy of science. The approach is novel in its use of cost-benefit analysis to guide people facing real reasoning problems and in its framework for resolving normative disputes in psychology. Based on empirical data, the book shows how people can improve their reasoning by relying on Statistical Prediction Rules (SPRs). It then develops and articulates the positive core of the book. The view presented — Strategic Reliabilism — claims that epistemic excellence consists in the efficient allocation of cognitive resources to reliable reasoning strategies, applied to significant problems. The last third of the book develops the implications of this view for standard analytic epistemology; for resolving normative disputes in psychology; and for offering practical, concrete advice on how this theory can improve real people's reasoning.

Scientists and laypeople alike use the sense of understanding that an explanation conveys as a cue to good or correct explanation. Although the occurrence of this sense or feeling of understanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for good explanation, it does drive judgments of the plausibility and, ultimately, the acceptability, of an explanation. This paper presents evidence that the sense of understanding is in part the routine consequence of two well-documented biases in cognitive psychology: overconfidence and hindsight. In light of the prevalence of counterfeit understanding in the history of science, I argue that many forms of cognitive achievement do not involve a sense of understanding, and that only the truth or accuracy of an explanation make the sense of understanding a valid cue to genuine understanding.

Speech perception and production are uniquely human adaptations. The mechanisms and laws that these adaptations implicate are tuned to linguistic rather than general auditory phenomena, leading to the view that speech is special (SiS). Despite the progress made by proponents of SiS, a small but growing "auditorist" program critical of SiS conscripts nonhuman animals such as quail and chinchilla and, using discrimination tasks on speech stimuli, incorrectly infers a common mechanism from similar cross-species performance. The author argues that the auditorist's refutation project must demonstrate not just cross-species isomorphisms of behavior but also either a common biological mechanism or common functional organization. The refutation project does neither. The author argues further that the auditorist's appeal to the principle of parsimony fails. Respect for the total available evidence undermines auditorism and bolsters SiS.

Philosophers agree that scientific explanations aim to produce understanding, and that good ones succeed in this aim. But few seriously consider what understanding is, or what the cues are when we have it. If it is a psychological state or process, describing its specific nature is the job of psychological theorizing. This article examines the role of understanding in scientific explanation. It warns that the seductive, phenomenological sense of understanding is often, but mistakenly, viewed as a cue of genuine understanding. The article closes with a discussion of several new paths of research that tie the psychology of scientific explanation to cognate notions of learning, testimony, and understanding.

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