Goal-directed cognition is often discussed in terms of specialized memory structures like the "goal stack." The goal-activation model presented here analyzes goal-directed cognition in terms of the general memory constructs of activation and associative priming. The model embodies three predictive constraints: (1) the interference level, which arises from residual memory for old goals; (1) the strengthening constraint, which makes predictions about time to encode a new goal; and (3) the priming constraint, which makes predictions about the role of cues in retrieving pending goals. These constraints are formulated algebraically and tested through simulation of latency and error data from the Tower of Hanoi, a means-ends puzzle that depends heavily on suspension and resumption of goals. Implications of the model for understanding intention superiority, postcompletion error, and effects of task interruption are discussed.

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The time to resume task goals after an interruption varied depending on the duration and cognitive demand of interruptions, as predicted by the memory for goals model (Altmann & Trafton, 2002). Three experiments using an interleaved tasks interruption paradigm showed that longer and more demanding interruptions led to longer resumption times in a hierarchical, interactive task. The resumption time profile for durations up to 1 min supported the role of decay in defining resumption costs, and the interaction between duration and demand supported the importance of goal rehearsal in mitigating decay. These findings supported the memory for goals model, and had practical implications for context where tasks are frequently interleaved such as office settings, driving, emergency rooms, and aircraft cockpits.

According to pure exemplar models, trait judgments about the self and others are accomplished by retrieving from memory trait-exemplifying behaviors and computing the similarity between the trait and the exemplars retrieved. By contrast, pure abstraction models argue that trait judgments are made by directly accessing abstract, summary knowledge of the person's traits. In a series of 4 studies, the role of behavioral exemplars and abstract trait knowledge in trait judgments about others and about the self was examined. The findings show that both types of information are used to make trait judgments but that the relative importance of each type is determined by the amount of trait-exemplifying behavioral experience one has with the person being judged.

We investigated the effect of short interruptions on performance of a task that required participants to maintain their place in a sequence of steps each with their own performance requirements. Interruptions averaging 4.4 s long tripled the rate of sequence errors on post-interruption trials relative to baseline trials. Interruptions averaging 2.8 s long-about the time to perform a step in the interrupted taskdoubled the rate of sequence errors. Nonsequence errors showed no interruption effects, suggesting that global attentional processes were not disrupted. Response latencies showed smaller interruption effects than sequence errors, a difference we interpret in terms of high levels of interference generated by the primary task. The results are consistent with an account in which activation spreading from the focus of attention allows control processes to navigate task-relevant representations and in which momentary interruptions are disruptive because they shift the focus and thereby cut off the flow.