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Objective. We examine how the immigration policy preferences of Anglos and Latinos vary according to ethnic context. Specifically, we hypothesize that immigration policy attitudes are a product of both Latino immigrant and Latino native born group size. In contrast to previous work, which found that Latinos and Anglos react to contextual forces in an identical manner, we argue that Latino group size produces opposite reactions for Anglos and Latinos. Methods. These hypotheses are tested using an original state‐wide survey of Anglos and Latinos in Texas conducted during 2006, which is supplemented with data from the 2000 Census. Results. Our findings show that residing in a heavily Latino area produces more liberal immigration attitudes among Latinos and more conservative attitudes among Anglos. However, this result is driven not by the size of the foreign‐born Latino population, but by the size of the native‐born Latino population. Conclusion. Anti‐immigrant sentiments among Anglos appear to result, at least in part, from ethnic concerns.

One key policy dispute in the school choice debate concerns whether the education bureaucracy is a cause or a consequence of poor performance. This dispute is striking because both sides accept the same neo-institutionalist organization theory. This paper uses a large panel of school districts to address the dispute. The evidence suggests that poor performance results in a growing bureaucracy not vice versa. Further evidence then shows that the growth in bureaucracy is associated in an increase in teachers and smaller class sizes; in short, bureaucracy increases as schools take actions that are linked to improved performance. Bureaucracy and Organizational Performance: Causality Arguments About Public SchoolsFew contemporary public policies are as controversial as school choice.School privatization advocates argue that market-based school systems can educate students better than public schools. Chubb and Moe (1988;, for example, contend that the institutional features of the public school system--particularly its bureaucratic structure and democratic governance--make it an ineffective organization that depresses student performance. Their remedy is to convert schools into more market-based institutions with less bureaucracy and less democratic control (Chubb and Moe 1988;. Opponents of school choice contend the proponents' arguments lack empirical support, fail to consider the multiple goals of public education, and support policies that generate more costs than benefits (Henig 1994;Paris 1995;Witte 1992;Smith and Meier 1995). (1994), in contrast, argue that bureaucracy is an adaptation to poor performance, that when organizations recognize their failures, they often take actions that, at least in the short run, generate more bureaucracy.Our research strategy addresses the link between bureaucracy and 2 performance in five steps. First, we outline the institutional theory of Chubb and Moe (1990) as it relates to bureaucracy. Second, using a unique panel data set of over 1000 school districts for a seven year period, we empirically test this key relationship in both organization theory and the real world of education policy. Third, we address the politics of responsiveness by assessing how these organizations respond to different types of students. Fourth, we continue the logic of the institutional theory to determine if the bureaucratic growth that does occur could affect future student performance. Finally, we note the implications of our findings for both organization theory and education policy. Institutional Theory and School ChoiceOften lost in the highly contentious debate over school choice is the theoretical contribution made by Chubb and Moe (1990) In the case of schools, ineffectiveness might not be conscious.Consistent with the basic principal-agent model, each interest seeks to institutionalize its demands on the school system by establishing rules, designing procedures that permit monitoring, and restricting discretion in the school system. Thus, democracy produces rules and leads to rigidi...

This article examines the political relationships between Latinos and African Americans in 194 multiracial school districts. The empirical results indicate that at times the relationship between Latinos and African Americans is competitive and at times it is complimentary. When scarcity is a factor, such as in administrative and teaching positions, gains by one group often result in losses by another. When the focus changes to policy questions where scarcity is not a factor (e.g., student performance), both groups gain at the same time.

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