Gilbert and colleagues (2018) point out the discrepancy between the limited empirical data illustrating changes in personality (and related concepts of identity, agency, authenticity, autonomy, and self, i.e., PIAAAS) following implantation of deep brain stimulating (DBS) electrodes and the vast number of conceptual neuroethics papers implying that these changes are widespread, deleterious, and clinically significant. Their findings are reminiscent of C. P. Snow's essay on the divide between the two cultures of the humanities (representing the conceptual publications) and the sciences (representing the empirical work). This division in the literature raises significant ethical concerns surrounding unjustified fear of personality changes in the context of DBS and negative perceptions of clinicianscientists engaged in DBS. These concerns have real world implications for funding future innovative, DBS trials aimed to reduce suffering as well as hampering true interdisciplinary scholarship. We argue that the philosophical tradition of pragmatism and the value it places on empirical inquiry, experiential knowledge, and inter-disciplinary scholarshipreflecting diverse ways of knowingprovides a framework to start to address the important questions Gilbert and colleagues raise. In particular, we highlight the importance of expert clinician knowledge in contributing to the neuroethical questions raised by Gilbert and colleagues. Finally, we provide illustrative examples of some of our interdisciplinary empirical research that demonstrate the iterative cycle of inquiry characteristic of pragmatism in which conceptual neuroethics questions have led to empirical studies whose results then raise additional conceptual questions that give rise to new empirical studies in a way that highlights the contributions of the humanities and the sciences.

Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) has emerged as a safe, effective, and appealing treatment for Parkinson's Disease (PD), particularly for improving motor symptoms (e. g., tremor, bradykinesia, and rigidity). However, concerns have been raised about whether DBS causes psychological changes, including changes to personality: characteristic and relatively stable patterns of affect, behavior, cognition, and desire. In this article, after first presenting some background information about PD and DBS, we examined evidence obtained from various empirical research methods (quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods for evaluating patient valued characteristics) pertaining to whether DBS causes personality change. General limitations across research methods include a lack of randomized clinical trials and small sample sizes. We organized our review of findings according to different layers of personality variables: dispositional traits (including personality pathology), characteristic adaptations, and narrative identity. Though most work has been done on dispositional traits, there is not much evidence that dispositional traits change following DBS. Little work has been done on characteristic adaptations, but there is somewhat consistent evidence for positive perceived progress toward goals across a number of domains: routine activities, work, social/relational, and leisure. Nascent work on narrative identity holds promise for revealing issues around self-image that may be common following DBS. We listed a number of strategies for advancing research, highlighting opportunities related to personality conceptualization, personality assessment, and interdisciplinary scholarship. Finally, we offer practical applications of our findings for the informed consent process and for ongoing treatment.

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The article Pragmatismand the Importance of Interdisciplinary Teams in Investigating Personality Changes Following DBS