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Brian Earp's and Julian Savulescu's provocatively titled "Love Drugs: The Chemical Future of Relationships" is a philosophically rigorous, scientifically informed, and yet wholly accessible study of the science and ethics of "love drugs" (and "anti-love drugs"). It is a must read for anyone interested in either the nature and value of love or the ethics of biomedical enhancement. A major strength of the book is the seriousness with which Earp and Savulescu address the arguments of their opponents. Anyone who is initially skeptical of the claim that the use of (anti) love drugs can sometimes be the best overall option should prepare to be challenged. The same can be said for anyone initially drawn to the idea that the use of these drugs would be generally detrimental to society.

Helen Frowe has recently objected to Michael Tooley's famous Moral Symmetry Principle, which is meant to show that in themselves killing and letting die are morally equivalent. I argue that her objection in not compelling but a more compelling objection is available.Specifically, Tooley's rebuttal of a proposed counter-example to his Moral Symmetry Principle has two problematic implications. First, it undercuts the very principle itself. If we reject the proposed counter-example, then, by Tooley's own lights, any instance of the Moral Symmetry Principle will actually demonstrate that killing and letting die are not morally equivalent. Second, it commits us to the view, which Tooley wishes to avoid, that we are just as obligated to refrain from doing wrong as we are to prevent others from doing the same. I end with a brief discussion of a more general concern regarding Tooley's basic strategy. My focus here is quite narrow. My claims, if plausible, only show that the Moral Symmetry Principle cannot serve as a basis for the view that killing and letting die are morally equivalent. 1

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