Among the truths of which contemporary thought stands in particular need and from which it could draw substantial profiit, is the doctrine of the distinction between individuality and personality. The essential importance of this distinction is revealed in the principles of St. Thomas. Unfortunately, a right understanding of it is difficult to achieve and requires an exercise of metaphysical insight to which the contemporary mind is hardly accustomed.Does society exist for each one of us, or does each one of us exist for society? Does the parish exist for the parishioner or die parishioner for the parish? This question, we feel immediately, involves two aspects, in each of which there must be some element of truth. A unilateral answer would only plunge us into error. Hence, we must disengage the formal principles of a truly comprehensive answer and describe the precise hierarchies of values which it implies.

My purpose is to consider Machiavellianism. Regarding Machiavelli himself, some preliminary observations seem necessary. Innumerable studies, some of them very good, have been dedicated to Machiavelli. Jean Bodin, in the XVIth Century, criticized The Prince in a profound and wise manner. Later on Frederick the Great of Prussia was to write a refutation of Machiavelli in order to exercise his own hypocrisy in a hyper-Machiavellian fashion, and to shelter cynicism in virtue. During the XIXth Century, the leaders of the bourgeoisie, for instance the French political writer Charles Benoist, were thoroughly, naïvely and stupidly fascinated by the clever Florentine.

T^H E subject I am discussing here deals with a very peculiar kind of knowledge -a kind of knowledge whose means is not concepts and reasoning, but affective inclination or affinity, and which is often disregarded by philosophers interested only in the rational kind of knowing. Henri Bergson liked to quote a sentence he found in the letters of a French philosopher; the sentence was as follows: "I have suffered from this friend enough to know him." When I know a friend to the core -not through having submitted him to a complete series of psychological tests, but because I have suffered from him and have got in myself the habit of his nature -then we may say in philosophical language that I know this man by connaturality.

To treat the many complex problems posed by Freudianism in one short essay is not an easy thing to do. The matter is further complicated by the fact that interest in Freud's discoveries and theories has not been restricted to psychological and psychiatric circles. On the contrary, it seems to grow greater and more ardent as it extends to less competent groups. Literary men have played an enormous role in the diffusion of Freudianism. It is a formidable trial for a scientific doctrine, or what is presented as such, to owe Its success to literary men and the general public. Serious objective discussion of the novelty it imports is confused. In the parasitical din that ensues it is seldom the voice of disinterested intelligence that is heard to advantage. All sorts of obscure desires of justification, vindication and a curiosity more or less pure intervene instead.Freud lends himself to such confusion because of the passion animating his investigative powers. This is even more true in the case of his disciples. As the abandonment to confusion grows greater on every side, it is the task. of the philosopher to attempt all the more persistently to make proper distinctions. I believe that any discussion of this subject is doomed to failure ISO

To Avoid misunderstanding, I should note at once that my point of view is here not that of the mere logic of ideas and doctrines, but that of the concrete logic of the events of history.From the first point of view, that of the mere logic of ideas and doctrines, it is evident that there are many possible positions other than the “pure” positions which I shall examine. One might ask theoretically and in the abstract, what value these various positions have. That is not what I plan to do. In a word, my point of view is that of the philosophy of culture, and not that of metaphysics.