Proposed psychological mechanisms generating noninstrumental information seeking in humans can be broadly categorized into two competing accounts: the maximization of anticipating rewards versus an aversion to uncertainty. We compare three separate formalizations of these theories on their ability to track the dependency of information-seeking behavior on increasing levels of cue-outcome delay as well as their sensitivity to outcome valence. Across three experiments using a variety of different stimuli, we observe a flat to monotonically increasing pattern of delay dependency and minimal evidence of sensitivity to outcome valence--patterns which are better predicted, qualitatively and quantitatively, by an uncertainty aversion information model.

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Factors affecting information-seeking behaviour can be task-endogenous (e.g., probability of winning a gamble), or task-exogenous (e.g., personality trait measures). Various task-endogenous factors affecting non-instrumental information-seeking behaviour have been identified, but it is unclear how task-exogenous factors affect such behaviour, and if they interact with task-endogenous factors. In an online information seeking experiment (N = 279), we focus on the role that outcome probability, as a task-endogenous factor, has on information preferences. We find reliable preference for advance information on highly probable gains and low preference for highly probable losses. Comparisons with individual trait measures of information preference (e.g., intolerance of uncertainty scale, obsessive-compulsive inventory, information preferences scale) reveal minimal association between these task-exogenous factors with choice task performance. We also find minimal interaction between outcome probability and individual trait measures. Despite the choice task and trait measures purportedly tapping the same (or similar) construct, the absence of clear relationships ultimately suggests a multi-dimensional nature of information preference.

The propensity for people to avoid mentally demanding tasks in the absence of reward is well documented. As a result, humans are often described as cognitive misers. This characterisation, while consistent with the psychological literature, contradicts everyday instances of effort being sought: reading, board games, and brain-teasing puzzles. Such examples however are markedly different from the types of tasks typically used in the mental effort literature (e.g., working memory tasks, demand selection tasks). The current set of experiments assessed whether the type of task (i.e., N-Back, Number Sequence Problems [NSP], or Anagrams) affects people’s aversion to, or desire for, increased effort. On average, across 3 experiments, participants showed an aversion to effort regardless of whether the effort required was more attentional (N-Back) or cognitive (NSP and anagrams) in nature, and were willing to forgo financial reward in order to avoid more difficult tasks. A minority of participants, however, sought more effortful tasks for equal or lesser reward.

Humans are often termed “cognitive misers” for their aversion to mental effort. Both in and outside the laboratory people often show preference for low-effort tasks and are willing to forgo financial reward to avoid more demanding alternatives. Mental effort, however, does not seem to be ubiquitously avoided: people play crosswords, board games, and read novels, all as forms of leisure. While such activities undoubtedly require effort, the type of cognitive demands they impose appear markedly different from the tasks typically used in mental-effort research (e.g., N-Back, demand selection tasks, vigilance tasks). We investigate the effect disparate demands such as rule discovery compared to rule implementation have on people’s aversion to or preference for increased mental effort. Across four experiments using three different tasks (i.e., N-Back, number sequence problems, and anagrams), and a mixture of online and lab-based settings we find that aversion to effort remains stable regardless of the types of cognitive demands a task imposes. The results are discussed in terms of other factors that might induce the pursuit of mental effort over and above the type of cognitive activity involved in a task.